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"The Congress finds that experience in both private and public
employment indicates that the.., right of employees to organize [and]
bargain collectively.., safeguards the public interest [and] contributes to
the effective conduct of public business."
- Federal Service Labor Management Relations Act (1978)'
1. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2000).
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"Do we really want some work rule negotiated prior to 9/11 to prevent
us from finding somebody who is carrying a bomb on a plane with your
momma?"
- Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) (2002)2
In the aftermath of the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, outside
observers might have been puzzled as to why a push to remove workers'
rights delayed the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
for several months. Specifically, the Bush administration and its
Congressional allies would not approve a bill creating the DHS unless the
President and administration officials were empowered to design a new
personnel system that allowed them to eliminate collective bargaining
rights and civil service protections for the approximately 170,000 workers
coming into the DHS.3  Notably, about 48,000 of these workers had
4previously enjoyed bargaining rights in predecessor agencies.
This issue has wide implications. The administration has already
implemented or proposed similar rules to remove collective bargaining and
related rights in other parts of the federal government, such as the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the vast Department of
Defense (DOD), and, still in the name of national security, some workers at
the Social Security Administration (SSA).' In turn, policies that affect
hundreds of thousands of federal employees are likely to affect all
American labor relations. The strike by the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Organization (PATCO) in the 1980s was a bellwether for
6private sector labor policies in that era. Most fundamentally, the DHS
debate showed a deep division in how unions are generally viewed: either
as useful protectors of worker rights or as obstacles to effective
management. For decades, the statutory pronouncements of Congress and
most state legislatures have favored collective bargaining in private and
public employment. Now this principle is under attack.
During these unprecedented attempts to undo established rights, the
2. 148 CONG. REc. S8710 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2002).
3. Marick F. Masters & Robert R. Albright, Labor Relations in the Department of
Homeland Security: Competing Perspectives and Future Possibilities, 54 LAB. L.J. 66, 68-
70 (2003).
4. Id. at 66-75; Derrick Cain, Union Rights, Personnel Flexibility Gridlock Dims Hope
Senate Will Pass Homeland Bill, 40 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1978, at 951 (Oct. 1,
2002).
5. See infra Section IV (explaining that the TSA is now part of the DHS, but it was not
when these rights were removed).
6. See, e.g., Charles McDonald, U.S. Union Membership in Future Decades: A Trade
Unionist's Perspective, 31 INDUS. REL. 13, 15 (1992) ("In 1981, President Reagan
constructed a union-avoidance theme when he annihilated the air traffic controllers and their
union .... "); David L. Gregory, Book Review, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 680, 681-83 (1985).
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debates were compartmentalized and ahistorical, leading to conclusions
that were uninformed and arguably, demonstrably wrong. The debate was
compartmentalized in that it ignored the experiences of unions outside the
federal government: both unions in the private sector and the diverse
experiments in public sector labor relations at the state and local level in
the past forty years. Policymakers also ignored the literature demonstrating
that unions often improve productivity. Instead, policymakers did little
more than parrot questionable anecdotes about some federal workplaces.
The discussions were ahistorical in that they rehashed-with no
apparent awareness-stale arguments about the role of unions in
government that date from the first half of the twentieth century.
Astonishingly, policymakers ignored how the theory and practice of public
sector labor relations in the second half of the century have addressed
outmoded concerns that worker rights are incompatible with efficient
public service and accountability. Thus, the debate was not informed by a
tremendous amount of available, relevant evidence from history and
experience: evidence of actual experiences under a variety of legal regimes
that allow collective bargaining, and evidence of how public sector
employment functioned where civil service and bargaining rules were weak
or nonexistent.
Because of this, policies crucial to the future of worker rights and the
provision of government services-including those relating to public
safety-risk retreating into a past that legislatures and the public have
largely rejected. Since 1959, no group of workers in the United States has
lost the right to bargain collectively under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),7 the law governing private workers. Moreover, public workers at
all levels of government have enjoyed greatly expanded collective
bargaining rights, albeit under diverse state and local rules.8 Those arguing
for an unprecedented reversal of this trend for a significant part of the
federal sector should have the burden of showing why this trend has been
in error or is inapplicable in this case. The history and experiences of other
unionized workers shows that the opposite is true. For example, assertions
that bargaining is inappropriate where public safety is involved should be
tested against the reality that collective bargaining is common in police and
7. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
8. In 2002, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported that about three-
quarters of the civilian workforce (103 million people) have some form of collective
bargaining rights under federal, state, or local laws. Of those that do not, most are
independent contractors (8.5 million), certain employees in small businesses (5.5 million),
supervisors and managers (10.2 million), and certain public employees (6.9 million).
Collective Bargaining Rights, Information on the Number of Workers with and Without
Bargaining Rights, GAO-02-835, 2-3, 14-16 (Sept. 13, 2002) [hereinafter GAO, Number of
Workers with and Without Bargaining Rights].
HOMELAND SECURITY VS. WORKERS' RIGHTS
fire departments.
More broadly, public sector labor law is an excellent example of states
acting as "laboratories of democracy." The United States has more than
forty years of experience with various public sector bargaining laws at the
federal, state and local government level, including laws covering public
safety workers. Federalist conservatives and liberals should agree that, in
crafting a federal sector law, we should learn from the best practices of
labor relations developed in the states. Equally relevant, prior to 1959,
public sector unions had existed uneasily for decades with no legal right to
bargain collectively. Before returning to this old legal regime, we should
understand how it worked in practice and why it has been rejected.
This article will argue that history and experience show that those who
would deny rights to workers in the name of national security have the
alleged "cost-benefit" analysis wrong. Not only do they rely on archaic
stereotypes that falsely assume a tradeoff between workers' rights and
efficiency, they also undervalue the importance of collective bargaining
rights. Policymakers should recognize that the right to form unions is
widely recognized (at least outside the United States) as a basic human
right. The right to unionize allows workers the effective ability to
participate in and influence decisions that affect their lives in vital ways.9
Happily, the evidence shows that granting these rights to federal employees
is in no way inconsistent with national security needs. Unhappily, the
evidence has thus far been ignored.
These issues are especially important because labor and employment
policies are still being developed at the DHS, DOD, and elsewhere. This
article describes what the history of public sector labor relations and studies
of unions can bring to the ongoing discussions about the formulation of
these policies. It calls for a less compartmentalized view of labor relations.
It is a uniquely American habit to separate public and private sector labor
policies so distinctly and to segregate rules for different government
jurisdictions so completely.' ° But separating policies for the DHS and
certain other federal workers from the history and experience of labor
relations has led to dangerously uninformed policies and proposals. The
federal workplace is not unique, not even to the extent that some parts of it
9. See James A. Gross, A Human Rights Perspective on United States Labor Relations
Law: A Violation of the Right of Freedom of Association, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
65, 66-70 (1999) ("The essential question the paper attempts to answer is whether the
fundamental human right of freedom of association is being violated in the content and
application of United States labor relations law.").
10. See Joseph E. Slater, The Court Does Not Know "What a Labor Union Is": How
State Structures and Judicial (Mis)Constructions Deformed Public Sector Labor Law, 79
OR. L. REV. 981, 1027-28 (2000) ("The development of American public sector labor law
on such an entirely diffferent track than private sector law is not at all 'natural'; it is in fact
exceptional.").
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have significant responsibility for public safety.
Part I of this article puts the federal sector issues in the context of the
increasing importance of public sector labor relations. Part II outlines the
evolution of modem federal sector bargaining and civil service laws. Part
III tracks the developments in the DHS and other parts of the federal
government where collective bargaining and civil service rights have been
challenged. Part IV describes the mistakes and omissions in the DHS and
related debates, placing them in a broader historical context. This section
notes the recurrence of discredited arguments from the first half of the
twentieth century, describes the problems that existed in the earlier era, and
explains how the law over the past four decades has addressed these
concerns. It also shows that modem "industrial relations" studies of the
effects of unions on productivity contradict the outdated stereotypes which
opponents of bargaining rights promoted. Part V discusses related points
involving civil service rules. Since the outcome of current debates over
federal employee rights remains unresolved, this article proposes the types
of data that policymakers should consider.
I. THE IMPORTANCE AND DIVERSITY OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR LAW
Collective bargaining in the federal sector is part of public sector labor
relations. In turn, the public sector is an increasingly important part of all
U.S. labor relations. From the mid-1950s to the 1990s, private sector union
density declined from more than 33% to less than 12%. In contrast, from
the early 1960s to the 1990s, public sector union density rose from less
than 13% to around 40%. Also, today about 40% of all union members are
public workers.1" Federal workers are a sizable part of these figures. Paul
Light of the Brookings Institution has estimated that their numbers will
soon rise to two million because of increased need for airport screeners, air
marshals, border agents, and immigration inspectors. 2 Indeed, since
September 11, 2001, civilian employment in the federal government has
risen by 4.5%.13
America is unique among industrialized democracies in sharply
11. In 1953, union density was 35.7% in the private sector and 11.6% in the public
sector. By 1996, the private sector rate was 10.2% while the public sector rate was 37.7%;
the public sector rate has remained around 40% since. Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The
Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause for Labor's Decline, 16
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 160 (1998); see also Stephen F. Befort, Labor and
Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C.
L. REV. 351, 361-62 (2002) ("Today union density is less than half what it was in 1950.").
12. U.S. Move to Open Gov't Jobs to Competition Angers Unions, Dow JONES INT'L
NEws, Nov. 15, 2002.
13. Ann McFeathers, 'Watchers' are 40% of Homeland Security, THE BLADE (Toledo,
Ohio), Aug. 25, 2003, at 1.
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differentiating legal rules for public and private sector labor relations.
Before the 1960s, the law everywhere in the Unites States prohibited
strikes and almost all collective bargaining in government employment,
and courts routinely upheld bans on union membership itself.'4 This "pre-
collective bargaining era" for public workers in the United States lasted
decades beyond when public workers in Britain and France won bargaining
and related rights quite similar to those of private sector workers in those
countries .
The public sector labor laws that have developed in the United States
in the past forty years vary tremendously. It has been estimated that now
"more than 110 separate state statutes govern public sector labor relations,
augmented by many local ordinances, executive orders, and other
authority."" Currently, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia
allow collective bargaining for all major groups of public employees;
thirteen states allow only one to four types of public workers to bargain
(most commonly teachers and firefighters); and eight do not allow any
public workers to bargain. 7 Thus, a clear majority of states allow
government employees of all types to bargain, and an overwhelming
majority of states allow at least some public sector bargaining. While only
twelve states allow any public workers to strike, of the states that allow
bargaining but not strikes, most require binding arbitration to settle
bargaining impasses. 
s
This unique history and these diverse modem experiences have
created a treasure-trove of information regarding the effects of various
types of rules on public workers and employers that should be used in
deciding how or whether to create new labor relations systems in federal
employment. Yet policymakers have thus far failed to integrate lessons
from private or public sector labor relations into the debates over the DHS
and other agencies.
14. See JOSEPH SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW,
AND THE STATE, 1900-62, 71-97 (2004).
15. See id. at 92-93.
16. RICHARD C. KEARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 58-59 (3d ed.
2001).
17. See id. at 62, 66 (describing which employees can bargain collectively). Estimates
on the number of laws vary somewhat; see, e.g., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE OF EIGHT STATES 5, 8 (Joyce M. Najita & James L. Stern eds.,
2001) (stating that there were over ninety public sector statutes; thirty-four states had
bargaining laws covering "all or some occupational groups," six states "authorized other
forms of representation and bargaining," and ten had "no such authorizations").
18. See KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 236-37, 262-65 (showing which states do not allow
strikes but do require binding arbitration).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL SECTOR LABOR LAW
A. Historical Development
Federal workers have long valued collective bargaining rights, even
though their rights have not been as extensive as those that private sector
workers enjoyed. Federal workers received limited collective bargaining
rights for the first time in 1962, when President John F. Kennedy signed
Executive Order 10,988.19 This Order provided three forms of union
recognition: "exclusive recognition" to a union chosen by a majority of
workers in a bargaining unit, allowing it to "meet and confer" with
management over policies affecting members of the bargaining unit;
"formal recognition" with accompanying "consultation" rights to a union
representing 10% of such workers; and "informal recognition" to a union
representing any such workers, allowing the union to express its views on
policies. 20  This order covered most federal workers, but excluded the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA).21 Presumably this was due to their central role in national security
22and the need for secrecy, but no explanation was given.
The rights were limited in that even exclusive representatives could
only bargain over a relatively small range of topics. Notably,
compensation and hours were not negotiable, as they were set by statute;
and the order had a strong management rights clause. 23 Further, there was
no mechanism to resolve bargaining impasses on subjects that were
24negotiable, and certainly no right to strike. Management made all final
decisions. Still, federal employees, desiring some voice in their working
25conditions, embraced their new rights. Within two years, 730,000 federal
26workers were covered by collective bargaining agreements.
In 1969, President Richard Nixon issued Executive Order 11,491 .27
This Order eliminated forms of recognition other than exclusive
19. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 17, 1962).
20. Id. (declaring the permissible functions of a union under each of the three forms of
recognition); KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 49 (describing the three forms of recognition
provided by Executive Order 10,988).
21. KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 49 (explaining which federal employees received
coverage by Executive Order 10,988).
22. Id.
23. See id. at 50 (showing that the management rights clause in Executive Order 10,988
greatly restricted the scope of bargaining).
24. See id.
25. See id. at 49.
26. Id.
27. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,605 (Oct. 29, 1969).
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28recognition. It added a crucial feature for any bargaining law:
management could no longer unilaterally dictate the outcome of bargaining
29impasses. Instead, independent government agencies would resolve
impasses; the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) would
mediate, and the Federal Services Impasse Panel (FSIP) was created to
settle impasses by binding arbitration.3°
B. Current Federal Sector Bargaining Law
1. Limited Bargaining Rights, but Workers Still Organize
Today, the main federal sector labor law is the Federal Service Labor
Management Relations Act (FSLMRA) of 1978.31 The FSLMRA sets out a
full set of rules for federal labor relations. It created the Federal Labor
Relations Authority (FLRA), a three-member panel that functions like the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) by adjudicating representation
32and unfair labor practice cases. The FSLMRA gives covered workers the
right to "engage in collective bargaining" with respect to "conditions of
employment," which are defined in part as "personnel policies, practices,
and matters. 33
The FSLMRA retained significant limits on union rights, restrictions
that often were understated or ignored in the DHS debates. First, federal
sector unions still cannot bargain over a number of subjects that private
sector unions are allowed to negotiate. For example, wages, benefits, and
hours of work are still set by statute and/or regulation and are not
negotiable.34 Nor can the parties negotiate for a union security clause,
28. See KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 51.
29. See id.
30. See id. (explaining the role of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and
the Federal Services Impasse Panel in resolving impasses).
31. Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (2000).
The FSLMRA was part of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92
Stat. 1111 (1978). The FSLMRA covers most, but not all, federal employees. The largest
exclusion from the FSLMRA's coverage applies to employees of the U.S. Postal Service.
Instead, the Postal Reorganization Act covers those employees. Postal Reorganization Act,
39 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1994). The Postal Reorganization Act also provides collective
bargaining rights to these federal employees. See 39 U.S.C. §§ 1005, 1201-09 (1994)
(providing postal service employees with the right to bargain collectively).
32. See § 7104; KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 53-54 (describing the FLRA). For
example, the FLRA hears cases to decide which categories of employees may join a
particular union bargining unit and to determine whether the parties can negotiate over a
particular bargaining proposal. See KEARNEY, supra note 16, 53-54.
33. See § 7102(2) (providing the right to engage in collective bargaining); § 7103(14)
(defining the conditions of employment that can be subjects of bargaining).
34. See § 7103(14) (excluding matters set by federal law, such as compensation, from
20041
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which makes the FSLMRA a "right to work" law.35 Also, the statute has a
broad management rights clause. Section 7106(a)(2) of Title 5 limits
negotiable subjects by stating that management has the authority:
(A) to hire, assign, direct, layoff, and retain employees in the
agency, or to suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take
other disciplinary action against such employees;
(B) to assign work, to make determinations with respect to
contracting out, and to determine the personnel by which agency
operations shall be conducted; ... [or]
(D) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the
36
agency mission during emergencies.
Indeed, of all labor laws, the FSLMRA contains some of the tightest
restrictions on what is legally negotiable.37 Federal sector unions are often
reduced to bargaining over the "effects" or "impact" of management
decisions, without any power to bargain over the decision itself.38  One
commentator concluded that this management rights clause "erected a
barrier... to expanding the scope of bargaining" such that "federal
management has generally retained its traditional rights more successfully
",39
than state and local managers ....
Second, federal sector unions cannot legally strike in any
circumstance.4° Instead, bargaining impasses are referred first to the FMCS
for mediation and then the FSIP for binding arbitration.4'
Still, because the FSLMRA does allow workers a genuine voice
bargining); KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 193.
35. Thus, federal sector unions cannot negotiate clauses that require members of union
bargaining units to pay any dues to the union obligated to represent them. See SEIU, AFL-
CIO Local 556 and Dept. of Army, 1 F.L.R.A. 563, 564 (1979) (declaring that the agency
shop proposal conflicts with § 7102 of FSLMRA); KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 53 (stating
that federal employees cannot negotiate union security arrangements).
36. § 7106(a)(2).
37. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. §§ 610.101-610.408 (2003) (defining certain work schedules as
nonnegotiable).
38. See generally PETER BROIDA, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY
LAW AND PRACTICE (16th ed. 2003), chs. 4-6; see also id. at 1210-13 (describing "impact"
bargaining rules on appraisals, breaks in work, parking, performance standards, and
training).
39. KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 194.
40. See 5 U.S.C. § 7116(7) (2000) (making it an unfair labor practice for a union to
participate in a strike, work stoppage or slowdown, to condone any such activity, or to fail
to try to stop any such activity if such picketing interferes with an agency's operations); 5
U.S.C. § 7311(3)-(4) (2000) (providing that an individual "may not accept or hold a
position" in the federal government if he or she "participates in a strike or asserts the right to
strike" against the government or "is a member of an organization of employees" that he or
she knows asserts such a right).
41. See 5 U.S.C. § 7119 (2000) (setting rules for how bargaining impasses are handled).
[Vol. 6:2304
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through collective bargaining in a range of decisions that affect their
working lives, federal employees continue to join unions in great numbers.
In 2001, 42% of local government workers were in union bargaining
42units. Unions are able to negotiate, for example, about such topics as
health and safety, training, antidiscrimination rules, and• • 43
grievance/arbitration procedures for discipline. Also significant for
employees, in both bargaining impasses and arbitrations over contractual
grievances, the FSLMRA provides for hearings by outside neutrals, instead
of giving agency managers final authority. 44
2. Existing National Security Exemptions
Also relevant to the DHS debate, the FSLMRA excluded or permitted
the exclusion of a few agencies and employees whose work was intimately
related to national security. There are three sources of such exclusions:
sections 7103(a)(3); 7103(b)(1); and 7112(b)(6). The legislative history
does not explain the purpose or potential scope of these exclusions, 45 and at
least until recently, all were used rarely and applied narrowly. For
example, as Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) noted during the DHS
debates, "Department of Defense civilians with top secret clearances have
long been union members. 46  Indeed, employees in all of the major
agencies that became part of the DHS were covered by the FSLMRA.47
42. Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and
Industry, Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release
/union2.t03.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
43. See BROIDA, supra note 38, at ch. 6 (providing a detailed discussion of what topics
are and are not negotiable under the FSLMRA).
44. See § 7119(c) (detailing the role and the functions of the Federal Service Impasse
Panel); 5 U.S.C. § 7121(b)(1)(C)(iii) (2000) (requiring binding arbitration when the parties
do not settle their grievance under the negotiated grievance procedures); BROIDA, supra note
38 (discussing the processes for bargaining impasses and arbitrations over contractual
grievances).
45. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. H13608 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (stating that the House
intended to exclude from § 7112(b)(6) employees whose investigation work directly
affected national security). The only discussion of § 7112(b)(6) is as follows:
[S]ection 7112(b)(6) excludes employees engaged in investigation or security
work which directly affects national security. It is our intention that, in order
for an employee to be excluded under subsection 7112(b)(6) because of
investigation work, that work must directly affect national security. (If this had
not been the case then the reference in subsection 7112(b)(7) to employees
engaged in certain investigation functions would have been surplusage because
these employees would already have been excluded by the preceding
subsection).
Id.
46. 148 CONG. REc. S8888 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2002).
47. Masters & Albright, supra note 3, at 70.
2004]
306 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 6:2
First, the FSLMRA specifically excludes certain agencies, including
those dedicated to sensitive and secretive security matters. Section
7103(a)(3) of Title 5 excludes the FBI, CIA, National Security Agency,
Secret Service, and Secret Service Uniformed Division.48
Second, § 7103(b)(1) grants the President the power to exclude any
agency or agency subdivision from coverage "if the President determines
that (A) the agency or subdivision has as a primary function intelligence,
counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work, and (B) the
provisions of this chapter cannot be applied to that agency or subdivision in
a manner consistent with national security requirements and
considerations. '49 This provision has been invoked fewer than a dozen
times since its adoption in 1978 and usually in narrow areas like the
Defense Intelligence Agency.5°  As discussed below, the Bush
administration created a controversy by applying this exception to workers
less obviously enmeshed in national security, employees of U.S. Attorneys'
offices around the country.
Third, § 7112(b)(6) allows agencies to exclude individual workers
from union bargaining units on national security grounds. It provides that
bargaining units under the FSLMRA cannot include "any employee
engaged in intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or security work
which directly affects national security."'" The FSLMRA does not define
"security work," "directly affects," or "national security."5 In the first
major case on this section, the FLRA defined "national security" to
"include only those sensitive activities of the government that are directly
related to the protection and preservation of the military, economic, and
productive strength of the United States., 53 The exclusion did not apply to
work involving mere access to and use of sensitive information.54 The
FLRA added that this exclusion should be read narrowly because it
deprived employees of unionization and bargaining rights, and Congress
had determined that unions and collective bargaining in the federal sector
are "in the public interest."55 In 1997, the FLRA slightly broadened the
reach of § 7112(b)(6) by excluding certain employees in the Justice
48. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(3) (2000). Other agencies (e.g., the Government Accounting
Office, the Tennessee Valley Authority) were exempted for unrelated reasons. See 5 U.S.C.
§7103(a)(3)(A), (E) (2000) (providing that the General Accounting Office and the
Tennessee Valley Authority were excluded from the definition of "agency").
49. § 7103(b)(1).
50. See 148 CONG. REc. S9583-84 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Lieberman).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(6) (2000).
52. Dep't of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, Oak Ridge, Tenn., 4 F.L.R.A. 644, 655
(1980).
53. Id. at 655-56.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 655 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7 101(a) (2000)).
HOMELAND SECURITY VS. WORKERS' RIGHTS
Department's Criminal Division and holding that this section can cover
workers in civilian as well as military agencies.56 Beyond this, prior to
very recent events, § 7112(b)(6) was rarely used. Indeed, there was never
any attempt to apply this exception to workers in the Customs Service,
Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), or other
agencies that would become part of the DHS.
C. Creation of Federal Civil Service Rules
Civil service protections are also at issue in the DHS and other
agencies. Federal civil service rules originated in the Pendleton Act of
1883.17 Passed in response to the assassination of President Garfield by a
man allegedly disappointed after not receiving a patronage job, this Act
attempted to decrease the role of political spoils and increase the
importance of merit in federal employment.58 It created civil service
exams, barred dismissals of covered employees for political reasons, and
created a bipartisan Civil Service Commission to enforce these rules.5 9
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 sets the current civil service
rules for federal employees. For example, 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b) requires that
"selection and advancement" are to be determined "solely" on the basis of
"relative ability, knowledge, and skills," and that "employees should be
retained on the basis of the adequacy of their performance. ' 6° The purpose
of the law is still to protect merit principles and to avoid patronage and
cronyism.
Although some in the DHS debates advocated cuts in civil service
protections, the current law has recently been criticized for being too weak
as it stands. Richard Kearney cites abuses of the merit principle during the
Reagan years, 6' and the Heritage Foundation argues that the "Travelgate"
controversy during the Clinton administration exemplified the "high spoils"
system.62
56. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Local 3719, AFL-
CIO, 52 F.L.R.A. 1093 (1997).
57. Civil Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
58. See MARGARET C. RUNG, SERVANTS OF THE STATE: MANAGING DIVERSITY AND
DEMOCRACY IN THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, 1933-53 23-24 (2002) (describing the political
corruption that fueled the creation of the Pendleton Civil Service Act).
59. Id.; KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 178.
60. 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b) (2000).
61. See KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 180 (explaining how the merit system was
undermined by abandoning written tests and relying too heavily on appointments).
62. See George Nesterczuk, Donald J. Devine & Robert E. Moffit, Taking Charge of
Federal Personnel, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER No. 1404, Jan. 10, 2001, at
5-6 (criticizing the Clinton approach to government management).
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III. NEW RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES: THE
AGENCIES So FAR
The FSLMRA and Civil Service Act applied to the agencies that
became part of the DHS. These statutes also applied or would have applied
to all other agencies discussed herein. However, over the past two years
the Bush administration has removed, proposed to remove, or given itself
the option to remove rights under these laws from a large number of
workers in agencies unrelated to the DHS. The scope and potential effect
of these moves to eliminate bargaining rights can only be understood in this
broad context. A chronology of the administration's actions follows.
A. The DHS
1. The Legislative Proposals
The DHS was the most highly publicized part of this story. The origin
of this agency came on October 8, 2001, when President Bush issued an
Executive Order creating the Office of Homeland Security within the
White House.6' Bush initially resisted the idea of a cabinet-level
department, but after political pressure mounted (originally from
Democrats), he endorsed the concept. 64 On June 18, 2002, he proposed
creating a Department of Homeland Security that would include employees
from the Customs Service, INS, Coast Guard, Federal Emergency
65
Management Agency (FEMA), TSA, and Secret Service.
The creation of the DHS was then delayed for several months, almost
entirely because of disagreements over the amount of authority the
President and the newly-created position of Secretary of Homeland
Security would have to waive civil service and collective bargaining rights
for workers in the new agency.66 Republicans argued for broader authority
and Democrats resisted. This played out in competing proposals: a bill
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) introduced in May 22, 2002, S. 2452;
the Republican version, H.R. 5005, as amended and passed by the House in
July 2002; and later a bipartisan compromise which the Senate rejected.67
63. Masters & Albright, supra note 3, at 67.
64. Id. at 67-69.
65. Id. at 68-69. For a discussion of issues that predated the labor rights debate,
including the question of whether a cabinet-level agency was appropriate, see Thomas
Cmar, Office of Homeland Security, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455 (2002).
66. See Masters & Albright, supra note 3, at 70, 75 (describing the repeated
unsuccessful attempts to pass H.R. 5005 given the conflicting opinions of the degree of
authority the executive would have to waive civil service and union rights).
67. Id. at 69-70.
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Under the original version of the Republican bill, H.R. 5005, the
Secretary of Homeland Security would establish a new personnel system
and would have complete authority to remove bargaining and other worker
rights." Under H.R. 5005 as revised and passed by the House, the default
would be that DHS workers would have FSLMRA rights, but the Secretary
could exclude any part of the agency, including those in existing bargaining
units, if the agency's mission and responsibilities materially changed and a
majority of employees in the agency division had as their primary duty
intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative work directly related to
terrorism. 69 Notably, the bill gave the President the ability to waive even
these requirements if "the President determines in writing" that applying
such requirements "would have a substantial adverse impact on the
Department's ability to protect homeland security."7°
Under the Lieberman bill, union rights were presumptively conferred
and the President could exclude certain units of the department only if he
determined that the majority of employees in that unit primarily focused on
intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative work directly related to
terrorism. 7' Thus, FSLMRA protections applied unless the President made
a specific determination that the majority of employees in the unit met the
existing statutory requirements; he could not waive these requirements.72
Further, employees who were denied collective bargaining rights could
appeal to the FLRA.73
After those proposals led to a stalemate, Senators John Breaux (D-
La.), Ben Nelson (D-Neb.), and Lincoln Chafee (R-R.I.) crafted a
compromise that would have narrowed the conditions under which the
President could remove the existing bargaining rights of employees from
predecessor agencies. In their bill, no division of the DHS could lose such
rights unless it was shown that the mission and responsibilities of the
division had materially changed, and that a majority of the employees
within the agency had as their primary duty intelligence,
counterintelligence, or investigative work directly related to terrorism.7 4
The compromise would also have allowed the President to rewrite civil
service rules, but the new rules could have been challenged through
binding arbitration by the FSIP.
75
68. See id. at 72 tbl. 3 (outlining aspects of each legislative proposal's provision on
labor rights).
69. See id. (describing H.R. 5005 provisions concerning union rights and the authority
of the Secretary of Homeland Security).
70. Id. at 75.
71. Id. at 72 tbl. 3.
72. Id. at 75.
73. 148 CONG. REc. S9584 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Lieberman).
74. Id.
75. See 148 CONG REc. S9201 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Breaux)
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The hostile reactions to this compromise demonstrated the
administration's seriousness about eliminating rights that workers coming
to the DHS had previously enjoyed. Then White House Press Secretary Ari
Fleischer called the compromise a "non-starter. 7 6 Senator Trent Lott (R-
Miss.) claimed that it was "an effort to try to find a way to make it difficult
or even impossible for the President... to be able to do the job on
homeland security. 77  Senator Lieberman replied that the bill would
merely protect against "truly arbitrary use by some future President. 78 The
President would retain his authority under existing law, but he would have
to explain why the employees' mission had changed enough to justify a
denial of bargaining rights, "when no previous President had said that
doing the work of that agency was inconsistent with... union
membership., 79 As to the provisions for independent arbitration by the
FSIP over new rules, Senator Breaux added that the FSIP is not an "arm of
the AFL-CIO," noting that the President appointed all of the FSIP's seven
members.S°
President Bush was unconvinced. "[I]t's a bill which I will not saddle
this administration and future administrations with allowing the United
States Senate to micro-manage the process. The enemy is too quick for
that.",8' The impasse was finally broken by the November 2002 midterm
elections, with Republicans winning a majority in the Senate. The Senate
then passed a bill very similar to the amended version of H.R. 5005, and
the President signed the bill into law on November 25, 2002.82
2. The DHS Statute
Under the statute, the DHS was to fold in 170,000 employees from
twenty-two predecessor agencies, over one-quarter of whom were covered
(explaining that the President would still have the power to remove collective bargaining
rights for certain government employees under the proposed Breaux-Nelson-Chafee
amendment); Derrick Cain, Union Rights, Personnel Flexibility Gridlock Dims Hope Senate
Will Pass Homeland Bill, 40 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1978, at 951 (Oct. 1, 2002)
(stating that under the Breaux-Nelson-Chafee amendment, challenges could be made to new
personnel rules through binding arbitration); see also 148 CONG. REc. S9200 (daily ed. Sept.
25, 2002) (offering Sen. Nelson's explanation of the bill).
76. Derrick Cain, Union Rights, Personnel Flexibility Gridlock Dims Hope Senate Will
Pass Homeland Bill, 40 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1978, at 951 (Oct. 1, 2002).
77. 148 CONG. REc. S9203 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2002).
78. 148 CONG. REc. S9384 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2002).
79. 148 CONG. REc. S9584 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Lieberman).
80. 148 CONG. REC. S9202 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2002).
81. 148 CONG. REc. S9406 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2002) (quoting a Sept. 21, 2002 radio
address by the President).
82. Masters & Albright, supra note 3, at 70 fig. 2, 71; Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
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by union contracts. 8' The largest of these agencies were the TSA, the INS,
the Customs Service, the FEMA, the Coast Guard, and the Animal and
Plant Inspection Service. For example, the DHS includes about 22,000
former Customs workers . Most agencies were transferred to the DHS in
March 2003 (for example, the INS became part of the DHS on March 1),
and all transfers were to be complete by September 30.85 By September,
the DHS employed one of every twelve workers in the federal
government.86
The DHS staff also included workers from seventeen different unions
that had negotiated seventy-seven collective bargaining agreements that
87covered around 48,000 workers. For example, the INS had three
bargaining units containing 24,324 employees; the Customs Service had
two bargaining units with about 12,000 employees; the Coast Guard had
forty-five bargaining units with 3,486 employees; and the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service had seven bargaining units with 2,498
88employees.
As to the power to design a personnel system waiving bargaining and
civil service rights, the final statutory language has been labeled "an
interesting compromise" that creates a presumption of continued
bargaining and related rights, while also creating strong authority to revoke
those rights.8 9 Section 9701 of Title 5 empowers the Homeland Security
Secretary to create, through joint regulations with the Director of the Office
of Personnel Management (OPM), a new personnel system for the DHS.
Such a system must conform with certain existing federal laws, such as
antidiscrimination statutes, but it need not follow existing law in other
83. See Federal Officials Consider Structural Issues in Building Homeland Security
Department, 40 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1987, at 1160 (Dec. 3, 2002). The Act
divides the DHS into four parts: information and infrastructure protection; border and
transportation security; science and technology; and emergency response. Jonathan Thessin,
Department of Homeland Security, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 513, 514 (2003) (offering a
variety of criticisms of this structure).
84. See Stephen Barr, Bush's Homeland Security Team Tries to Reassure, Rally the
Troops, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2002, at B2.
85. Administration Anticipates Smooth Transition as INS Functions Move to Homeland
Security, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1999, at 225 (March 4, 2003). The DHS
was to be fully operational by November 25, 2003. Bush Signs Homeland Security Bill,
Taps Ridge to Head New Department, 40 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1987, at 1159
(Dec. 3, 2002).
86. McFeathers, supra note 13.
87. 148 CONG REC. S9375 (Sept. 26, 2002); Bureau of National Affairs, Union Rights,
Personnel Flexibility Gridlock Dims Hope Senate Will Pass Homeland Bill, 41 Gov't Empl.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 951 (Oct. 1, 2002).
88. Masters & Albright, supra note 3, at 69 tbl. 1; New Homeland Security Department
Faces Challenges, USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 2002, at A2.
89. Masters & Albright, supra note 3, at 80.
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important areas, including FSLMRA rules on collective bargaining. 90 To
create the new personnel system, the Homeland Security Secretary and the
OPM Director were to draft rules, give existing unions thirty days to
comment on them, notify Congress of any recommendations, "meet and
confer" for at least thirty days with the unions, and possibly use FMCS to
mediate if the Homeland Security Secretary or a majority of unions making
recommendations so request. 91 But the Homeland Security Secretary and
the OPM Director are specifically authorized to implement their own
proposals unilaterally after the thirty days "if the Secretary determines, in
the Secretary's sole and unreviewable discretion, that further consultation
and mediation is unlikely to produce agreement. 92 The statute does not
provide for any neutral authority with binding power.93
As to the President's power to eliminate bargaining rights, 6 U.S.C. §
412 contains a default rule that existing bargaining units will retain
FSLMRA rights, but it also sets out the President's authority to waive such
rights using the language of H.R. 5005 as amended.94 Currently, it appears
90. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 9701(b)-(c) (West Supp. 2003) (listing chapters of federal law that
cannot be modified in a new personnel system; not listed are major provisions such as 5
U.S.C. ch. 43 (2000) (performance appraisals); ch. 51 (job classifications); ch. 53 (pay
rates); ch. 71 (labor-management relations); ch. 75 (adverse actions); and ch. 77 (appeals));
see also AFGE, Homeland Security: Questions & Answers, available at http://www.afge.org
/Index.cfm?Page=QuestionsAnswers (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) (elaborating on the six areas
in which the system need not comply). The law is somewhat ambiguous as to the extent to
which the Secretary of Homeland Security can waive bargaining rights through this new
system. 5 U.S.C.A. § 9701(e) states that the new personnel system shall ensure a right to
"bargain collectively" but the law does not require the new system to follow existing
FSLMRA rules- in ch. 71. One could imagine "bargaining rights" in which the impasse
resolution procedure involved no neutrals, but was simply at the Homeland Security
Secretary's sole discretion. Also, the President still has the authority to exclude part or all
of the agency from collective bargaining entirely.
91. 5 U.S.C. § 9701(e). In theory, the notification period would give lawmakers time to
mobilize public pressure to objectionable provisions. See Christopher Lee & Stephen Barr,
New Agency, New Rules, and a Cost, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2002, at A31.
92. U.S.C.A. § 9701(e)(1)(C)(ii).
93. There is some hortatory language in 6 U.S.C. § 411, which states that it is the
"sense of Congress" that "it is extremely important" that DHS employees "be allowed to
participate in a meaningful way in the creation of any human resources management system
affecting them." 6 U.S.C. § 411 (West Supp. 2003). This is because the employees "have
the most direct knowledge of the demands of their jobs." Id. Thus, a "collaborative effort
will help secure our homeland." Id. The Homeland Security Secretary, however, has the
power to resolve unilaterally any disagreements that might arise during any collaboration.
Id.
94. 6 U.S.C. § 412(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2003) states that the President can exclude
workers from bargaining if the agency or agency subdivision's responsibilities materially
change and a majority of the employees within such unit have as their "primary duty
intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative work directly related to terrorism
investigation." But § 412(c) adds that the President can waive even these requirements (ten
days after telling Congress why the waiver is needed) if he determines that these
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that employees moved from other agencies that were covered by collective
bargaining agreements will retain those agreements and bargaining rights
for at least one year, but perhaps not beyond that.95
Thus, the future of bargaining and civil service rights remains unclear.
Paul Light concluded that Congress had "punted" by leaving the design of
the system so open, noting that Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge
had a "very significant controversy on his hands., 96  Proponents of
bargaining rights have not given up. After the law was signed, Senator
Lieberman said that if the President decided "to eliminate collective
bargaining within a unit of the Department... I am confident the Congress
will not just sit back and watch. 97
There is hope for a more informed debate. In the spring of 2003, DHS
leaders created a "design review team" to help create the new personnel
system.98 Three unions contributed team members: the National Treasury
Employees Union (NTEU), the American Federation of Government
Employees (AFGE), and the National Association of Agricultural
Employees.99 The sixty-person team promised to look at the best practices
of both federal and state agencies.'00 In early October 2003, the team
unveiled a list of fifty-two options for the DHS. °'0 As to labor relations,
proposals varied considerably. They included expanding or narrowing
negotiable topics, limiting the time for bargaining, allowing management to
suspend bargaining rights for national security reasons, and removing the
authority of the FSIP and FLRA altogether. 102  The next step is for
Secretary Ridge to issue proposals, triggering the thirty-day comment
period and the thirty day "meet and confer" period (with possible
requirements "would have a substantial adverse impact on the ability of the Department to
protect homeland security." See Bureau of National Affairs, Law Allows Personnel System
Flexibility; Some Provisions Extended Governmentwide, 40 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1987, at 1159 (Dec. 3, 2002).
95. Bureau of National Affairs, DHS Team Will Look at Personnel Systems; Panel to
Consider Recommendations This Fall, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2004, at 369-
70 (Apr. 8, 2003); Tim Barker, Push to Unionize Screeners Turns into a Political Battle,
ORLANDO (FLORIDA) SENTINEL, May 18, 2003, at HI.
96. Lee & Barr, supra note 91, at A31.
97. 148 CONG. REC. S11004 (2002).
98. Bureau of National Affairs, SFLERP Speakers Offer Differing Views on Current
State of Federal Labor Relations, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2011, at 564-65
(May 27, 2003).
99. Id.
100. Bureau of National Affairs, DHS Team Will Look at Personnel Systems; Panel to
Consider Recommendations This Fall, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2004, at 369
(Apr. 8, 2003).
101. Bureau of National Affairs, Personnel System Design Team Issues Report; Wide
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103mediation).
B. Transportation Safety Administration: Collective Bargaining Already
Eliminated
A few months after the DHS bill was signed into law, the
administration again signaled its seriousness about this issue by banning
collective bargaining at the TSA. The TSA was created on November 19,
2001 by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.' °4 There was a brief
debate over whether the federal government should assume the traditionally
private role of screening passengers and baggage at airports, but in the
aftermath of 9/11 both political parties supported the federalization of these
jobs.10 5 The TSA soon hired nearly 56,000 screeners to work at more than
480 airports. 10 6  On March 1, 2003, the TSA was transferred into the
DHS.'0 7
Prior to the transfer, James Loy, the head of the TSA, banned
bargaining. 0 8 On January 8, 2003, he issued an Order stating that TSA
employees, "in light of their critical national security responsibilities, shall
not... be entitled to engage in collective bargaining or be represented for
the purpose of engaging in such bargaining by any representative or
organization."'1 9 Loy explained, "Mandatory collective bargaining is not
compatible with the flexibility required to wage the war on terrorism."" 0
He added, "Fighting terrorism demands a flexible workforce that can
rapidly respond to threats. That can mean changes in work assignments
and other conditions of employment that are not compatible with the duty
to bargain with labor unions.' He also stated that the Order was a
103. AFGE, Things Are Moving Along; The DHS Timeline for Developing a New
Personnel System, available at http://www.afge.org/Documents/DHS-UpdateFlyer.pdf
(last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
104. Aviation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597, 49 U.S.C. § 44935, et
seq. (2001).
105. Molly Selzer, Comment, Federalization of Airport Security Workers: A Study of the
Practical Impact of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act From a Labor Law
Perspective, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 363, 365-66 (2003).
106. Bureau of National Affairs, AFGE Charters National Air Screener Local,
Challenges Legality of TSA Bargaining Ban, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2000, at
253 (Mar. 11, 2003).
107. Id. at 254.
108. Loy had become the head of the TSA in July 2002. Seizer, supra note 105, at 368.
109. Memorandum from James M. Loy, Secretary of Transportation for Security, to the
TSA Security Screeners (Jan. 8, 2003), available at http://www.afge.org/Documents
FLoyTSAMemo.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
110. Bureau of National Affairs, TSA Order Bars Screeners From Bargaining; Union
Files Suit, Will Continue Organizing, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1992, at 27 (Jan.
14, 2003).
111. Id.
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response to AFGE's organization of TSA employees."'
Loy's position came as a bit of a surprise. Prior to his Order, the Wall
Street Journal had reported that experts thought it unlikely that he would
prohibit bargaining in the TSA.' 3 Also, Paul Light had said that it was
"hard to make the argument that these jobs are somehow so sensitive they
should be exempt from bargaining."
'1 14
A debate ensued which, like the debates over the DHS that are
discussed in greater detail below, questioned the utility of collective
bargaining rights without reference to actual experiences with bargaining in
any of a host of contexts. TSA official Nico Melendez simply asserted that
"security is paramount and collective bargaining could cripple the
system."' 15  Using unsupported and inaccurate stereotypes of inherent
union inefficiency, Loy's spokesman Robert Johnson added, "When it
comes to responding to new intelligence or terrorist threats on a moment's
notice, we don't have time to check with a shop steward." '116 TSA official
Chris Rhatigan similarly claimed that "collective bargaining would be
incompatible with the nation's safety.""' 7 Union supporters were indignant.
Sonny Hall, president of the AFL-CIO's Transportation Trades
Department, insisted that Loy's position was "akin to saying that being a
union member gives aid and comfort to the enemy. ' 18 Absent from this
debate were data from or comparisons to labor relations outside the federal
government: for example, the fact that pilots, flight attendants, airline
mechanics, and others in the airline industry all have the right to bargain
collectively under the Railway Labor Act (RLA)." 9
112. Id. In November 2002, AFGE had filed petitions with the FLRA to represent TSA
workers at Baltimore-Washington International and LaGuardia Airports. Bureau of
National Affairs, AFGE Charters National Air Screener Local, Challenges Legality of TSA
Bargaining Ban, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2000, at 253 (Mar. 11, 2003);
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, AFGE v. Loy, available at
http://www.afge.orglndex.cfm?Fuse=Document&DocumentlD=121 (last visited Feb. 1,
2004) (citing FLRA Case Nos. WA-RP-03-0023 and BN-RP-03-0008).
113. Stephen Power, Union Makes Appeal to Airport Screeners, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18,
2002, at A4.
114. Id.
115. David Bacon, Screened Out: How 'Fighting Terrorism' Became a Bludgeon in
Bush's Assault on Labor, THE NATION, May 12, 2003, at 22.
116. Newswire Release, Airport Screeners Forbidden From Unionizing, TSA Chief Says,
Associated Press (Jan. 10, 2003) (on file with author).
117. Bacon, supra note 115, at 22.
118. Union Rights Stripped from Airport Screeners, Says AFL-CIO, 840 Lab. L. Rep. 5
(CCH) No. 1302, at 5 (Jan. 22, 2003).
119. Id. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88, 44 Stat. 577 (1926). The
RLA covers private sector airlines and provides full collective bargaining rights. 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 (2000).
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C. Broadened Use of National Security Exclusions: The U.S. Attorney's
Office, NIMA, and the Social Security Administration
Furthering the trend of restricting bargaining rights in the name of
national security, the Bush administration has made broad use of the
existing national security exemptions in the FSLMRA. First, on January 7,
2002, President Bush issued Executive Order 13252, pursuant to his
authority under FSLMRA § 7103(b).' 2° This Order excluded from
collective bargaining employees in five sections of the Department of
Justice, most significantly in U.S. Attorneys Offices (affecting around
1,000 workers) and the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. 
z
2
The administration has also taken a more aggressive approach with
FSLMRA § 7112(b)(6), the provision allowing agencies to exclude
individual workers from union bargaining units on national security
grounds. In 2002, SSA officials argued that certain SSA employees should
be excluded from a bargaining unit because their work "directly affects
national security."' 2 2  The jobs at issue-"electronics technician" and
"physical security specialist"--did not even require a security clearance. 23
But the SSA insisted that this exemption applied, arguing that there would
be a. "significant effect on the national economy" if information in SSA
facilities were to be lost. 24 For example, the agency maintained that if its
computers were disrupted, "40 million people would be delayed in
receiving their social security checks.' 2 5 Although the FLRA's regional
director had ruled that these employees should not be excluded under §
7112(b)(6), the FLRA, citing an "absence of precedent," granted the
agency's application for a new hearing on the issue.
126
Then, in September 2003, the FLRA agreed with the SSA and
120. See Bacon, supra note 115, at 19.
121. See Bureau of National Affairs, NIMA Director Excludes Employees From
Bargaining Citing Security Concerns, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1996, at 148
(Feb. 11, 2003) (quoting Harnage's statement that "the decision to exclude the NIMA
employees from collective bargaining is consistent with the Bush administration's anti-
union history."). The other sections excluded were INTERPOL-U.S. National Central
Bureau, the National Drug Intelligence Center, and the Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review. JOSEPH GRODIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 13-14 (2003); Louis C.
LaBrecque, Locals Representing Workers at DOJ Agencies Dissolved by Bush Order,
Federal Unions Told, 40 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1943, at 59-60 (Jan. 15, 2002).
122. Soc. Sec. Admin., Balt., Md., 58 F.L.R.A. 170, 171 (2002).
123. Id. at 171.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 173.
126. Id. at 174.
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reversed the decision of the regional director. 27 The regional director had
noted that none of the individuals at issue were involved in the
investigation of security clearances, none maintained classified materials,
none communicated top secret information, and again, none of the jobs
required a security clearance. The FLRA held that the employees were
excluded nonetheless. The "directly affects national security" test was met
if the employees' job tasks included: "(1) the designing, analyzing, or
monitoring of security systems or procedures; or (2) the regular use of, or
access to, classified information.' ' 29  The FLRA cited the Homeland
Security Act's finding that the government protects both classified and
"sensitive but un-classified" materials, 3 ° and the FLRA determined that an
employee could be covered by § 7112(b)(6) even if the employee's job did
not require a security clearance. 3' It held for the first time that threats to
"economic security" alone were covered by § 71 12(b)(6).32 Under this
standard, given that the workers at issue had some responsibility for
designing or implementing security systems for SSA databases and
facilities, they could be excluded from union bargaining units.'33
This case shows how far themes from the DHS debate can be pushed.
The connections among (i) collective bargaining, (ii) the potential problem
of social security checks, and (iii) a direct impact on national security seem
tenuous at best. More generally, if these employees "directly affect"
national security, then this exception could easily swallow the general rule
allowing bargaining in the federal sector. If providing physical protection
services to agencies whose disablement would have a substantial effect on
the national economy constitutes work that "directly affects national
security," then it arguably follows that guards and other employees at
practically every federal agency should be excluded from bargaining.
Moreover, the SSA decision can be read as holding that employees can be
excluded if they have responsibilities for a system that, were it to be shut
down, could potentially have a disruptive effect on the economy. This
interpretation could exclude a significant number of employees in
practically every executive branch agency that deals with economic issues,
including, for example, the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture
Departments. Again, the FLRA originally held that the § 7112(b)(6)
exclusion should be read narrowly because Congress had determined that
collective bargaining in the federal sector is "in the public interest."'
3 4
127. Soc. Sec. Admin., Bait., Md., 59 F.L.R.A. 137 (2003).
128. Id. at 139 (citing the regional director's decision).
129. Id. at 143 (citing United States Dep't of Justice, 52 F.L.R.A. 1093, 1103 (1997)).
130. Id. at 144 (citing § 891 of the Homeland Security Act).
131. Id. at 145.
132. Id. at 145-46.
133. Id. at 146.
134. Dep't of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, Oak Ridge, Tenn., 4 F.L.R.A. 644, 655,
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Going even further than the majority, the concurring opinion of FLRA
Chairman Cabaniss held that if a federal agency simply designates a
position as "sensitive" in the national security sense, the FLRA would have
no power to review that designation. 135 For example, the union could not
try to show that an employee's duties did not actually implicate national
security. Such an approach, if adopted, would be entirely inconsistent with
modem law, which mandates that the FLRA look at the actual duties of a
job. 116 But it would be consistent with a disastrous series of cases from an
earlier era of public sector labor law, discussed in section IV.A. below.
These cases effectively gave the direct employer of labor the power to
decide whether its employees would have bargaining rights.
Further, on January 28, 2003, James Clapper, Director of the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) announced that NIMA employees
would no longer have collective bargaining rights due to national security
concerns. 3 7  Clapper's memo also voided existing collective bargaining
agreements among NIMA and two AFGE locals representing more thanS 138
1,000 employees. Among the employees affected were cartographers,
digital imaging specialists, data management specialists, and security
guards.13 9
This move was also controversial. The legislation establishing NIMA
in 1996 allowed continuation of collective bargaining as long as the duties
of the workers did not change to include certain national security tasks.
4 0
But Edward Obloy, NIMA's general counsel, said that grandfathering in
bargaining rights was a "one-time solution" and that the September 11
attacks made it necessary to reclassify NIMA jobs to involve intelligence
(1980) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7 101(a)).
135. Soc. Sec. Admin., Bait., Md., 59 F.L.R.A. at 147.
136. BROIDA, supra note 38, at 7-8.
137. Louis C. LaBrecque, NIMA Director Excludes Employees From Bargaining, Citing
Security Concerns, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1996, at 148 (Feb. 11, 2003).
138. Id.
139. Id.; Letter from Bobby L. Harnage, Sr., National President, AFGE, to the Honorable
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) (Feb. 21, 2003), http://www.afge.org//Index.cfmPage
=AirportScreeners&File=200302_21 letter.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
140. National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act, 10 U.S.C. § 461(c) (1996). 10 U.S.C.
§ 461(b) provides that NIMA would recognize unions under the FSLMRA if they existed in
the predecessor Defense Mapping Agency. But § 461(c) adds:
[if NIMA's Director] determines that the responsibilities of a position within a
collective bargaining unit should be modified to include intelligence,
counterintelligence, investigative, or security duties not previously assigned to
that position and that the performance of the newly assigned duties directly
affects the national security of the United States, then, upon such a modification
of the responsibilities of that position, the position shall cease to be covered by
the collective bargaining unit [and the employee can no longer be represented
by a union with FSLMRA rights].
HOMELAND SECURITY VS. WORKERS' RIGHTS
duties that would disqualify workers from bargaining rights.' 4' Bobby
Harnage, then the president of AFGE, responded by stating that NIMA
workers were "performing the same jobs they have performed for years,"
and that the agency's mission "has not changed."'
' 42
1. The Future? Department of Defense Proposals
The trend described above became even broader with new proposals
for workers in the DOD. On May 22, 2003, the House passed H.R. 1588,
which would have allowed the Secretary of Defense to create a new
personnel system for the DOD, again gutting established employment
rules. 143 The bill would have barred local union bargaining on issues of
department-wide interest and require national-level bargaining " '44
More importantly, the bill would have eliminated the role of the
independent FSIP in resolving bargaining impasses. 45 Instead, when an
impasse occurred, the Secretary of Defense could simply impose his or her
own decision (after Congressional notification). 46 On November 24, 2004,
President Bush signed legislation authorizing the DOD to create it's own
personnel system. Similar to the process at the DHS, the new DOD system
will be created through regulations issued jointly by the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of the OPM. Among other things, the new law
will allow the DOD to bargain at a national level with unions, rather than
local unions; to replace Merit Systems Protection Board hearings with an
internal process (with eventual appeal rights to the full Board); and, most
ambiguously and potentially problematic, to replace the FLRA with
another third-party to review labor disputes.
47
These provisions could be even more significant than the DHS law.
141. Louis C. LaBrecque, NIMA Director Excludes Employees From Bargaining, Citing
Security Concerns, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1996, at 148 (Feb. 11, 2003).
142. Id.; Harnage to Specter, supra note 139.
143. H.R. 1588, 108th Cong. § 9902 (2003); DOD Proposes 'Transformation' Bill;
Workforce Management Changes Sought, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2006, at
421 (April 22, 2003); Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Rumsfeld Labor Proposal Draws Fire, BALT.
SUN, May 21, 2003, at 3A.
144. Louis C. LaBrecque, DOD Changes Included in House-Passed Bill, But Not
Senate's Version; Conference is Next, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2011, at 545
(May 27, 2003); Louis C. LaBrecque, DOD Personnel Reform Bill Clears Committee On
Party-Line Vote; Would Affect NASA, SEC, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2009, at
499, 500-01 (May 13, 2003).
145. Louis C. LaBrecque, DOD Personnel Reform Bill Clears Committee On Party-Line
Vote; Would Affect NASA, SEC, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2009, at 499, 500-01
(May 13, 2003).
146. Id. at 500.
147. President Signs DOD Authorization Law Allowing Creation of New Personnel
System, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2036, at 1185 (Dec. 12, 2003).
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The DOD, with roughly 700,000 employees, is the second-largest federal
employer of civilian workers in the nation, after the Postal Service.
148
Given its size, changes to the DOD's personnel system would almost surely
affect other federal employees, and quite possibly affect workers outside
the federal government. "We're concerned about the 'domino effect,"' said
Jeff Friday, counsel for NTEU.1
49
Debates on this proposal have followed a now-familiar pattern. The
proposed change, said Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, is "nothing
less than a national security requirement."' 50 Opponents claim the plan
strips workers of key rights and would allow politics to creep into
personnel decisions.'
Thus, attempts to restrict worker rights have spread throughout the
federal government and have become one of the central labor-management
issues of the day. Still, the arguments on both sides of the debate have
lacked context and history. As one article on the DHS put it, the "crux of
the controversy boiled down to one question: is unionism compatible with
homeland security? The answer depended largely on the pre-existing view
one had of what unions do."' 52 Unfortunately, the debates have ignored the
rich and instructive history of labor relations in this country, a history that
can help resolve the debate.
IV. FOUR MISTAKES FROM PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR HISTORY THAT
SHOULD NOT BE REPEATED
A. Allowing the Employer to Make the Law
One of the central features of the new and proposed personnel systems
discussed above is that they all allow agency officials-the direct
employers of labor-not just to set workplace policies, but also to create
the legal rules that govern whether those policies are valid and how they
may be modified or challenged. In all these schemes, the employer can
remove substantive rights, such as the right to bargain collectively. The
employer can also remove crucial procedural rights like the right to have
bargaining impasses or grievances heard by neutral third parties. Before
148. Davis, supra note 143.
149. Louis C. LaBrecque, SFLERP Speakers Offer Differing Views on Current State of
Federal Labor Relations, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2011, at 565 (May 27,
2003).
150. Davis, supra note 143.
151. For example, Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) said, "We want to make sure that
employees are rewarded and treated based on merit, not on their political loyalties and
political favoritism." Id.
152. Masters & Albright, supra note 3, at 75.
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the 1960s, nearly all of the public sector effectively operated in this
fashion, leading predictably to an extraordinarily restrictive legal regime. 53
Decades after the NLRA gave private sector workers the rights to organize,
bargain, and strike, public workers remained unable to strike or bargain,
and they lacked even the basic right to organize. 154 Beginning in the 1960s,
however, policymakers at all levels began rejecting this older model both
out of concern for workers' rights and a desire for better-functioning public
agencies.1
51
1. Deference, Democracy, and Employers Making the Law in
History
Through the 1960s, employers had the effective power to create legal
rules for their employees due to court doctrines of deference and
delegation, and due to the policy concern that public officials should set
terms of employment without influence from unions, arbitrators, or even
courts. 1 6 Courts held that legislatures had delegated power over public
employment to local officials, and therefore judges should defer to the
decisions of those officials regarding unions. 57 For example, in 1935 the
Virginia Supreme Court held that a local public employer had enough
power to classify union membership as "cause" for discharge under a civil
service statute that required "cause" for removal. 58
This degree of judicial deference meant that the employers' own
policies became the effective "law" of labor relations in local government
agencies. Not surprisingly, local officials often simply barred their workers
from organizing unions.1 59  For example, in 1917 the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the Chicago Board of Education's ban on a teachers' union,
stating that the court would defer to the board in all aspects of hiring.' 60
153. Slater, supra note 10, at 981-82.
154. Id.
155. SLATER, supra note 14, at 158-203.
156. Id. at 71-96, 158-92.
157. Courts had a great deal of power in public sector labor cases in this era, because
until 1959, no state had passed a general public sector labor statute. Id. at 71-96, 158-92.
158. Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 316 (1935). A related legal objection to union
rights in this era was that bargaining or arbitration would violate constitutional
nondelegation doctrines by shifting public power to private hands, such as a union, and/or
an arbitrator. See, e.g., Mugford v. Mayor of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 270 (1945) (striking
down an agreement between the city and the union recognizing the union as the collective
bargaining agent of its members). This concern has been rejected by the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions in the past forty years, although a few still cling to it. Karen M.
Speiser, Note, Labor Arbitration in Public Agencies: An Unconstitutional Delegation of
Power or the "Waking of a Sleeping Giant?", 1993 J. DisP. RESOL. 333, 340-42 (1993).
159. See Slater, supra note 10, at 990-1000.
160. People ex rel. Fursman v. City of Chicago, 116 N.E. 158, 160 (Ill. 1917).
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Similarly, fire departments banned the firefighters' union161 and police
departments banned police unions. 62 This policy finally began to change
in the 1960s, when policymakers began to realize, among other things, that
the employer was not in the best position to judge what rights its employees
should have vis-d-vis the employer. 
63
A related concern was that as a matter of policy (rather than law)
bargaining eroded democratic control of public agencies. As summarized
by Clyde Summers, the traditional argument is that in the public sector "the
collective agreement is not a private decision, but a governmental
decision."' 64 For example, as labor costs are often a major part of a city's
budget, bargaining over compensation implicates levels of taxes and
services.1 61 Similarly, "holidays close city services for the day," and
"[o]ther contractual provisions may affect the kind or quality of public
services provided."1 66  Thus bargaining "shapes policy choices which
rightfully belong to the voters to be made through the political
processes.' 67
Some comments during the DHS debates echoed this point. Senator
Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.) paraphrased part of a Franklin Roosevelt quote:
"All government employees should realize that the process of collective
bargaining has its distinct and insurmountable limitations" in the public
sector "because the obligation to serve the whole people is paramount.
1 68
This objection ignores how public sector bargaining laws have addressed
concerns about public control of public services.
2. How Public Sector Law Addressed These Concerns: Limits on
Bargaining Topics
In recent decades, concerns about control of government services
mainly have been addressed by limiting the topics that public sector unions
can negotiate. The idea that the government simply could not bargain with
unions was increasingly rejected. As early as the 1930s, William Leiserson
(a member of the NLRB) wrote that public sector unions should be able to
161. See, e.g., CIO v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143, 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946)
(preventing the fire department from unionizing).
162. See, e.g., City of Jackson v. McLeod, 24 So. 2d 319, 322 (Miss. 1946) (dismissing a
member of the police force for union activities); see also City of Cleveland v. Div. 268 of
Amalgamated Ass'n of St. & Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 90 N.E.2d 711, 716
(Ohio C.P. 1949) (barring a union of public transportation employees).
163. SLATER, supra note 14, at ch. 6, conclusion.
164. Clyde Summers, Bargaining in the Government's Business: Principles and Politics,




168. 148 CONG. REc. S9571 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2002).
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contract with employers in areas where legislation did not set the term of
employment. 69  "Within the limits of our authority we have got to
bargain," he insisted. "° "We must not hide behind the Government and say
the Government can't bargain.'' In 1955 the American Bar Association
declared that statutory bars on public workers organizing and bargaining
were "not satisfactory approaches.' ' 2  Private sector rights, "modified to
meet the unique needs of the public service," should be granted to
government employees.'73 In 1959, the ACLU called for bargaining rights
for public workers. 174  This was partly a reaction to actual, informal
negotiations already taking place in the public sector.' In 1957, Edward
Cling argued that the "great deal of informal collective bargaining" actually
occurring in government employment meant that "legalistic" and other
objections to public sector bargaining "must be reviewed from a practical
standpoint.'
' 76
Thus began serious explorations of how labor law could be adjusted to
fit the public sector. Today, the majority of states address concerns about
democratic control by limiting the issues that can be subjects of collective
bargaining. For example, as shown above federal sector unions under the
FSLMRA generally cannot negotiate pay rates because they are set by
statute.177 Typically under state law, staffing levels and issues involving
the budget and mission of a public agency are nonnegotiable, as are certain
matters covered by civil service rules such as merit examinations.1
71
Certain professions can have additional, specific restrictions; in public
schools, for example, class size, the length and beginning of the school
year, and curricular issues are generally nonnegotiable. 79  Jurisdictions
vary as to what issues are negotiable, and thus offer real world data for
comparison and study as to which issues are best left to legislatures, agency
managers, or collective bargaining.
80
169. RUNG, supra note 58, at 126.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Report of the Committee on Labor Relations of Governmental Employees, 1955
A.B.A. SEC. LAB. REL. L. PROC. 89, 89.
173. Id.
174. SLATER, supra note 14, at 161.
175. Id. at chs. 5 & 6.
176. Id. at 164. See infra Section IV.D.1. for more on "informal" bargaining.
177. See infra Section II.B.1.
178. For example, jurisdictions are split as to whether drug testing is a mandatory subject
of bargaining in certain public sector jobs. HARRY T. EDWARDS ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS
LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 383-90 (4th ed. 1991). To cite another model, Nevada limits
public sector bargaining to twenty specified items. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 288.1500
(Michie 2002).
179. KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 202-03.
180. See generally EDWARDS, supra note 178, at 358-469 (collecting cases and statutes).
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The solution of allowing bargaining on limited topics also responds to
concerns about democracy by recognizing that elected officials are not
involved in the day-to-day process of labor relations. As Senator Barbara
Boxer (D-Cal.) asked during the DHS debates, "Doesn't the President have
more things to occupy himself... than worrying about whether a secretary
or a file clerk" can bargain collectively over routine work rules? 18' More
broadly, decades of experience in all levels of government have shown that
it is possible to bargain successfully over a range of topics more limited
than those bargained over in the private sector without inhibiting
democratic control of government.
B. Misguided Strike Fears and Misunderstanding Alternatives for
Resolving Bargaining Impasses
1. Impasse Resolution Issues in the Current Debates
During the DHS debates, Senator Boxer pointed out that "[flederal
employees cannot strike, nor should they. That is not an issue." 182 None of
the unions or workers in any of the agencies discussed in this article have
gone on strike. Still, the alarming prospect of a strike appeared in recent
rhetoric. Regarding President Bush's order excluding certain Department
of Justice employees from bargaining, White House Press Secretary Ari
Fleischer stated that "[tihere is a long tradition the presidents of both
parties have honored about protecting the public by not allowing certain
law enforcement or intelligence officials to strike."' 83  This statement
contains the classic mistake, all too common in the first half of the
twentieth century, of conflating bargaining and the right to strike.
Others confused strikes and bargaining as well. Praising the TSA's
denial of bargaining rights, Charles Slepian of the Foreseeable Risk
Analysis Center stated that even if screeners could not legally strike, union
workers could use related tactics such as sick-outs and work slowdowns to
apply pressure during contract negotiations. ' 4 "We can't start messing
around with the aviation industry," he added. 85 Slepian did not cite any
examples of screeners or related workers using or threatening such tactics,
nor did he comment on the fact that private sector workers in the aviation
181. 148 CONG. REc. S9058 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002).
182. 148 CONG. REc. S8072 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 2002). Senator Lieberman (D-Conn.)
echoed this statement. 148 CONG. REc. S9583 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2002).
183. GRODIN, supra note 121, at 20; Bush Bars Some U.S. Officials From Going on
Strike, REUTERS, Jan. 7, 2002.
184. Barker, supra note 95, at HI.
185. Id.
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industry (including pilots, flight attendants, and mechanics) can all bargain
collectively under the RLA.
18 6
Beyond the specter of strikes, opponents of bargaining implied that a
binding impasse resolution procedure that uses neutral arbiters is inherently
problematic, either because it might prevent the employer from doing what
it wants or because the process could take some time. Senator Phil Gramm
(R-Tex.) seemed to object in principle to the idea that a union could ever
win an issue through third-party resolution. 187 He recalled an effort "in
1987, to change the makeup of our inspection center in the Customs office
at Logan Airport."' 188 The union appealed to the FLRA "and the power of
the Administration to change the configuration of the inspection room was
rejected."'' 89 This statement was apparently a reference to U.S. Customs
Service and National Treasury Employees Union,'90 in which the FLRA
held that the employer improperly renovated the room because it did so
without providing the union with notice and an opportunity to bargain over
the effects of the change.' 9' Gramm's statement goes to the very idea that a
neutral body could tell an agency that the agency could not do exactly what
it wanted to do, rather than demonstrate that any particular decision of such
a neutral body has hurt security or efficiency.
Senator Thompson was concerned about the time impasse resolution
can take.
If the union refuses to enter into a negotiated agreement with
you, you have to go to the Federal Services Impasses Panel.
I don't think.., the Federal Services Impasses Panel-whatever
that is-is going to come up with terrible decisions; it is, again,
do we really need to go through this kind of process... ?192
He added, "I cannot stand here and tell you how long it would take... but
I can assure you it would be longer than it should."'193 Thompson derided
disputes "that go on for months and sometimes years over such issues as
whether or not the annual picnic was rightly called off.' ' 1 9 4  "The
administrative process is rife with cases such as disputes over whether or
not the smoking area should be lit. Sometimes it takes years in order to
resolve issues that way."' 95
186. Id.
187. 148 CONG. REc. S8710 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2002).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 29 F.L.R.A. No. 65 891 (1987).
191. Id. at 891.
192. 148 CONG. REc. S9571 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2002).
193. Id.
194. 148 CONG. REC. S9568 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2002).
195. Id.
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Again, neither these examples nor data from the decades of experience
with various forms of impasse resolution in the public sector show that
binding impasse procedures using neutral arbiters prevent agencies from
taking actions important to public safety. In the federal sector, the strong
management rights clause limiting what unions can bargain to impasse
makes this even less of a concern. Indeed, it is revealing that Thompson
cited cases involving picnics and lighting as opposed to staffing, for
example, which is not negotiable. Even assuming delays in resolving
lighting issues, would that threaten security? Federal employees cannot
strike at impasse, and other aspects of agency work are not halted while the
FSIP and FMCS consider particular issues at impasse.196  On the other
hand, the right to have a voice through collective bargaining in day-to-day
labor relations matters is important to federal workers, as witnessed by the
fact that 42% of them belong to union bargaining units.' 97 As will be
shown in more detail below, considerable evidence suggests that this voice
also increases employer efficiency.
2. Overcoming the Strike Fear and the Development of Alternative
Impasse Resolution Procedures
Here too, modem debates ignored historical lessons. Over the course
of the twentieth century the assumption that public sector bargaining would
lead to strikes was eventually addressed by laws providing a variety of
alternate methods of resolving bargaining impasses. Up until the 1960s,
judges denied public workers the right to bargain and even organize partly
because judges feared that these workers would strike.19 s In 1943 a New
York state court, in a case that did not present any strike issues, proclaimed
that strikes against the government represented "rebellion against
constituted authority."' 99 As late as 1962, a South Dakota court upholding
a bar on public workers organizing, referred to the threat of strikes, even
196. See BROIDA, supra note 38, at chs. 4-6.
197. Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and
Industry, Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release
/union2.t03.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
198. See Slater, supra note 10, at 1016-17 (discussing the impact of the Boston police
strike on later unionization efforts).
199. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607-08 (1943),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 267 App. Div. 470 (1944),
affd, 56 N.E.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1944), affd, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). Other courts echoed the
"rebellion against constituted authority" line, again in cases that did not involve any strike
issues, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. and Trades Council, 94 Cal.App.2d
36, 48 (1949). See also City of Cleveland v. Div. 268, 90 N.E.2d 711, 715 (Ohio Ct. App.
1948) ("The right to strike, if accorded to public employees, I say, is one means of
destroying government. And if they destroy government, we have anarchy, we have
chaos.").
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though the facts of the case raised no issue regarding strikes or a claimed
right to strike.2°0
The belief that public sector unions necessarily would strike was
based on a lack of experience with alternate impasse resolution methods.
Judges quoted Franklin Roosevelt, stating that "collective bargaining as
usually understood cannot be transplanted into the public service" partly
because strikes "could never be allowed. 20' These judges ignored the
subtlety of Roosevelt's caveat "as usually understood., 20 2 For example,
Roosevelt supported laws allowing limited bargaining in some New Deal
agencies, notably the Tennessee Valley Authority; strikes were barred, but•203
the parties used other methods to resolve impasses. The fears were also
not based in actual experience. Starting in 1919 and continuing through the
early 1960s, both AFL and CIO public sector unions renounced the strike
weapon, and public sector strikes were rare, short, and small.2°
By the 1950s mainstream voices began pondering alternatives for
impasse resolution. The Providence Evening Bulletin editorialized that a
fear of strikes "lies at the root of all suspicion of public unions," but it
added that in exchange for a ban on strikes, unions should have mediation•205
and binding arbitration to settle bargaining impasses. Anticipating later
empirical findings, Professor Roland Posey wrote that the danger of public
sector strikes came from refusing to recognize unions, not from allowing
bargaining.2°6 Arvid Anderson, a prominent labor-relations professional in
Wisconsin, agreed: "[A]bsent adequate grievance and collective bargaining
procedures, public employee disputes will increase in number and
seriousness.",207 Anderson also argued that in lieu of strikes, public sector
200. Levasseur v. Wheeldon, 112 N.W.2d 894 (S.D. 1962).
201. CIO v. Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143, 144-45 (Tex. Ct. App. 1946).
202. Id.
203. The TVA began bargaining with unions in 1936. In 1940, Roosevelt praised a
"splendid new agreement" produced by bargaining, adding that "collective bargaining and
efficiency have proceeded hand in hand." STERLING D. SPERO, GOVERNMENT As EMPLOYER
346 (1948). These rights were, of course, limited. As to wages, the parties were bound by
prevailing rates; negotiations merely determined what that rate was. Id. at 438-40; MURRAY
NESBITT, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE 99 (1976).
204. This was partly a reaction to the infamous Boston police strike of 1919. See
SLATER, supra note 14, at 13-39. Some public workers did strike during the strike wave of
1946, but such actions were relatively minimal. In 1946-the height of public sector strikes
until the late 1960s-there were forty-three strikes of municipal workers. But these were
mostly one day actions, and the time lost in this exceptional year was only 0.034% of total
municipal working time. In that same year, private sector strikes cost 1.5% of total working
time. Id. at 82.
205. SLATER, supra note 14, at 164.
206. Id.
207. Arvid Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 1961 WIS. L. REV. 601,
633.
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208
unions should be able to use mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration.
In the 1960s, states began passing laws that allowed public sector
bargaining and created alternative impasse resolution mechanisms. The
first such law was passed in Wisconsin in 1959 and strengthened in 1962
and thereafter. 209  After the 1962 revisions, the law provided that at
impasse, a state agency could conduct mediations at the request of both
parties and fact-finding at the request of either party. 2 ° Later, the law was
amended to provide for binding arbitration. 2t1 This trend caught on quickly
thereafter. By 1966, sixteen states had enacted laws extending some
bargaining rights to at least some public workers. 212  Today, while only
twelve states allow any government employees to strike, thirty-eight states
provide some impasse procedures for at least some unionized public
workers. 213  This has led to diverse practices: thirty-six states use
mandatory or optional mediation; thirty-four use fact-finding; and thirty
have arbitration as the final step, with twenty-one using binding
arbitration.2t 4
Thus, while variations abound, the federal government and two-thirds
of the states have adopted public sector impasse procedures that do not
end-as recent proposals for federal workers discussed above do-with
management officials making the final decision (twelve states allow strikes
215and twenty-one states use binding arbitration). Notably, proponents of
limiting the rights of federal workers have not cited any data or examples
from binding arbitration jurisdictions showing that binding arbitration
interferes with public safety or agency efficiency.
Equally intriguing for the DHS and related debates, research indicates
that public sector laws providing for arbitration to resolve impasses are
208. Id. at 629-33.
209. Chap. 509 of Wisconsin Laws of 1959, Wisc. Stat. Ch. III, subchapter IV. For a
description of the long fight to pass this law, see SLATER, supra note 14, at ch. 6.
210. Chap. 663 of the Laws of 1961, amending Wisc. Stat. ch. III, subchapter IV.
211. See Najita & Stem, supra note 17, at 71.
212. SLATER, supra note 14, at 191.
213. KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 236-38 tbl. 8.2, 262, 264-65 tbl. 9.1 (listing state strike
rules and bargaining impasse rules).
214. Id. at 262; GAO, Number of Workers with and Without Bargaining Rights, supra
note 8, at 10 n.18.
215. There are differences within these broad categories as well. In some states, both
parties must request mediation; in others, the state agency may intervene on its own.
KEARNEY, supra note 18, at 263. Within the universe of arbitration, about fifteen states
require "final offer" arbitration for at least some workers (meaning that the arbitrator must
choose one party's final offer); other states allow arbitrators to make compromises. Id. at
264-65 tbl. 9.1, 274. In "final offer" arbitration, some systems require the arbitrator to
select one set of proposals as a whole; others allow the arbitrator to choose one party's
language on some issues and the other party's language on others. Id. at 274. Statutes also
differ in the criteria they require arbitrators to consider in their impasse decisions. Id. at
275-77.
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more successful in preventing strikes than are statutory bars on strikes
alone.21 6 Indeed, in the past two decades, although public sector bargaining
has been quite common, public sector strikes have been relatively rare. For
the sixteen-year period from 1982 to 1997, there were no strikes by federal
employees, twenty-three strikes by state employees (no more than five in
any one year), and ninety-three strikes by local government employees (no
217more than ten in any one year). Federal workers in PATCO did strike in
1981, but this event seems like the proverbial exception that proves the
rule.218 If anything, the disastrous PATCO strike may have ensured that
other federal employees would not strike in the future.219
C. Inaccurate Stereotypes of Union Workers: Divided Loyalty and
Inefficiency
Advocates of eliminating worker rights have echoed outdated,
inaccurate stereotypes of unions as inherently inefficient without
supporting evidence. Thus, they set public safety in opposition to worker
rights, often dramatically. Senator Gramm insisted that "[w]hen workers'
rights interfere with people's right to their life and their freedom .... there
has to be some flexibility., 220 He asked rhetorically whether preserving a
system "that was designed primarily to protect workers ... [is] more
important than enhancing the probability that we can protect lives?,
221
Even Democratic Senator Zell Miller (D-Ga.) predicted, "They will ask:
Why did they put workers' rights above Americans' lives?, 222  Long-
established standards for government employment were, in this view, now
threats. Mitch Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
explained, "Our adversaries are not encumbered by a lot of rules. Al-Qaida
does not have a three-foot thick code., 223 Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)
argued, "Since when did al-Qaida become our role model for labor-
management relations?, 224 Still, the type of argument advanced by Daniels
has been repeated. Terrorism "does not have a bureaucracy," said Gordon
England, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security.225 "It is very lean, very
216. Id. at 277 (citing sources).
217. Id. at 226-27.
218. Bernard D. Meltzer & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Employee Strikes, Executive
Discretion, and the Air Traffic Controllers, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 731 (1983).
219. See id. (discussing the PATCO strike and its implications on the future of the
federal antistrike policy); see also Seizer, supra note 105, at 376-79 (discussing the PATCO
strike's impact).
220. 148 CONG. REC. S9373 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2002).
221. 148 CONG. REc. S9190 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2002).
222. 148 CONG. REC. S9195 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2002).
223. 148 CONG. REC. S7730 (daily ed. July 31, 2002) (quoted in statement of Sen. Byrd).
224. Id.
225. Tamara Audi, Homeland Defenders Cite Burnout Dangers, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
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quick, very agile and therefore we need to be the same way or we'll
lose. 226 Most directly, Senator Gramm asked, "Do we really want some
work rule negotiated prior to 9/11 to prevent us from finding somebody
who is carrying a bomb on a plane with your momma?
' 227
I. Overcoming Inaccurate Stereotypes in History
In the early twentieth century, stereotypes about inherent union
inefficiency were common. They often combined with claims that union
workers would exhibit divided loyalty, tom between conflicting duties to
labor and to employers. In 1920 a Texas court, upholding a bar on a
firefighters' union, explained: "an employer cannot have undivided fidelity,
loyalty, and devotion to his interests from an employee who has given to an
association right to control his conduct., 228 Indeed, a "man who is by
agreement... shackled in his faculties-even his freedom of will-may
well be considered less useful or less desirable by some employers ....,229
In 1917 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a ban on a teachers' union in
Chicago because it would be "prejudicial to the efficiency of the teaching
force., 230 In 1919 Edwin Curtis, the Commissioner of Police in Boston,
helped trigger the Boston police strike of 1919 by banning union affiliation
by police officers on divided loyalty grounds. 3  Curtis claimed that a
policeman trying "to serve two masters" would fail either as an officer or
"in his obligation to the organization that controls him.'
a32
As with the DHS debates, union opponents in this era stressed these
arguments most when public safety workers were involved. Many
jurisdictions barred police officers from organizing unions. For example,
in 1919 officials in Washington, D.C. instituted such a ban, citing "divided
loyalty. '233 In 1920 a Texas court upheld the power of local authorities to
dismiss members of a firefighters' union, noting that the union had not
specifically pled that union membership would not affect firefighters'
234loyalty. As late as 1963, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld a bar on
police unionizing, stressing the need for "undivided allegiance. 235
Feb. 26, 2003, at IA, 7A.
226. Id.
227. 148 CONG. REC. S8710 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2002).
228. McNatt v. Lawther, 223 S.W. 503, 505 (Tex. Ct. App. 1920).
229. Id. at 506.
230. Fursman v. City of Chicago, 116 N.E. 158, 158 (Ill. 1917) (quoting rule 93a as
amended on September 29, 1915 by Chicago's board of education).
231. SLATER, supra note 14, at 26.
232. Id. at 29 (quoting General Order 110 issued by Police Commissioner Curtis).
233. Id. at 20, 22.
234. San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local Union No. 84 v. Bell, 223 S.W. 506, 511 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1920).
235. AFSCME Local 201 v. City of Muskegon, 120 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Mich. 1963).
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Beginning with the New Deal era, however, claims about union
disloyalty and inherent inefficiency became increasingly rare. The
watershed in the private sector came in 1935 with the passage of the
NLRA. 236 The NLRA's findings and declaration of policy stated that
"protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively safeguards commerce from injury" and declared it to be
national policy to avoid such injuries "by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining" and protecting the right to organize
237unions. Around the same time, "industrial pluralist" scholars such as
John Commons were producing influential works arguing that unions could
be and were sources of efficiency in industry and justice in society.23 s
The NLRA did not apply to public sector unions,239 and the move to
apply "industrial pluralist" theories to government employment came later.
But beginning in the 1960s, similar ideas started to appear in public sector
labor statutes. For example, in the federal sector, the findings and purpose
section of the FSLMRA states that "experience in both private and public
employment indicates that" the right of workers to organize and bargain
collectively "safeguards the public interest" and "contributes to the
effective conduct of public business., 240 Thus, policymakers had rejected
anti-union stereotypes.
2. Modern Debates: Unions As Inefficient and Possibly Disloyal
Nonetheless, the DHS debates reverted to pre-New Deal caricatures of
unions, featuring not only charges of inefficiency but also veiled
accusations of divided loyalty. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)
complained that the DHS bill was "being held up because some labor
unions want to put their special interests ahead of the collective interests of
the Nation's security. '241 Senator Robert Bennett (R-Utah) said that the
Nelson-Breaux-Chafee compromise was "enough of a crack in the door, for
some future union leader ... for reasons totally unrelated to the mission of
the Department... [to] decide that he or she wants to pick a fight with the
President. 242
Proponents of worker rights replied that there was no evidence that
236. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1994).
237. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
238. See MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA 109, 124-31,
156 (1994); Bruce E. Kaufman, John R. Common and the Wisconsin School on Industrial
Relations Strategy and Policy, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 3 (2003).
239. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). The NLRA excludes employees of "the United States...
or any State or political subdivision thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
240. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2000).
241. 148 CONG. REc. S9685 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2002).
242. 148 CONG. REC. S9384 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2002).
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civil service or bargaining led to any problems surrounding 9/11 or
impeded the fight against terrorism; indeed, nobody even claimed such a
link existed.243 In response to an inquiry from a House lawmaker, OPM
could not cite any examples of unions compromising national security.'
44
As one commentator observed, "[C]riticism of the nation's homeland
security preparedness has largely been directed at the lack of coordination
and accountability of federal agencies, not at the ... level of performance
of workers in the agencies merged into the new DHS. Thus it makes little
sense to strip workers of collective bargaining rights .... ,245
Still, anti-union stereotypes appeared not only in Congressional
debates, but also in policy papers that both reflected and influenced
administration policy on federal personnel matters. The Heritage
Foundation issued a report that repeatedly depicted labor unions as self-
246interested impediments to providing services. The report charged that
federal sector unions are primarily "committed to strengthening their
political clout. '247 Unions are "at best, responsible [only] to their members.
At worst, they represent the permanent government acting on its own self-
interest .. 248 The report's antipathy to collective bargaining is clear. It
characterized President Bill Clinton's Executive Order 12871, which
created "labor-management partnerships" as "turning the Administration
over to federal labor unions. 249  In fact, the order merely encouraged
250federal agencies to discuss permissive topics of bargaining with unions.
Agency managers always had the discretion to impose their proposals on
these topics, and there were no sanctions for not taking part in
251partnerships. Indeed, the OPM found that these partnerships reduced
labor-management conflicts while improving labor-management
252communications. Yet such objections to unions, again with little or no
243. See generally Gordon Lafer, Fighting on Two Fronts, DISSENT, Fall 2002, at 5
(discussing government activities post 9/11 and their impact on labor).
244. Masters & Albright, supra note 3, at 77; see also Donald G. Aplin, AFGE Charters
National Air Screener Local, Challenges Legality of TSA Bargaining Ban, 41 Gov't Empl.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2000, at 253 (Mar. 11, 2003) ("TSA did not make a finding that
screener unions would interfere with its national security mission .....
245. Thessin, supra note 83, at 531.
246. Nesterczuk, supra note 62, at 1.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 24.
249. Id. at 3-5.
250. See Exec. Order No. 12,871, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,201 (Oct. 6, 1993) (establishing the
National Partnership Council and implementing labor-management partnerships throughout
the executive branch).
251. Id.
252. See Masters & Albright, supra note 3, at 81 (citing U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MGMT., Labor-Management Partnership: A Report to the President (Dec. 2000), at
http://www.opm.gov/lmr/report (last visited Feb. 1, 2004)). The Heritage Foundation report
ultimately admits that the Order's effect was only "recommending" that agency heads be
HOMELAND SECURITY VS. WORKERS' RIGHTS
actual support, were a palpable force in the debate.
3. Advocates of Worker Rights Also Fail to Use Broader
Perspectives
Proponents of worker rights made surprisingly few efforts to counter
these claims with evidence from the broader world of labor relations. They
did note that unionized federal workers had not caused any security
problems. In this regard, Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.) cited the 200,000
DOD workers with bargaining rights. "Many of those employees have
high-level security clearances," Sarbanes noted, but this "never seemed to
impair our national security .... ,,253
Proponents did cite the broad powers that federal managers already
have under existing law. Senator Lieberman stressed the limits on
negotiable topics in the FSLMRA, noting that this law already gave
agencies the power to act unilaterally during emergencies. 2 4 Claims that
union contracts interfere with security by tying the hands of managers with
116 255"'silly union work rules' ... are simply not true," Lieberman insisted.
"When lives are at stake... a [f]ederal manager can impose any changes in
assignments immediately, without dealing with unions at all. 256 AFGE's
Harnage agreed that "[e]very contract... can be waived or suspended by
management unilaterally during an emergency. 257  More generally,
Senator Daniel Akaka (D-Haw.) quoted U.S. Comptroller General David
Walker's conclusion that federal agencies already had considerable
flexibility.2 8 AFGE cited an OPM publication stating that current law
provided managers with many "flexibilities. 259  Senator Byrd quoted a
study from the nonpartisan Partnership for Public Service, concluding that
"cooperative." Nesterczuk, supra note 62, at 25.
253. 148 CONG REC. S 11,194 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2002).
254. 148 CONG. REC. S9197 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2002).
255. Id.
256. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(2)(D) ("[Niothing in this chapter shall affect the
authority of any management official of any agency ... to take whatever actions may be
necessary to carry out the agency mission during emergencies.").
257. Tom Ramstack, Defiant Airport Screeners Join Union; Federal Employees Begin
Challenge to Ban on Bargaining, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at Al.
258. 148 CONG. REc. S8888-89 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2002).
259. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, You ALREADY HAVE THE
FLEXIBILITY YOU SEEK 3 (2002), at http://www.afge.org/Documents/HSAFGEReport.pdf
(last visited Feb. 1, 2004) (referencing OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, HUMAN
RESOURCES FLEXIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (July 25, 2001),
at http://www.opm.gov/omsoe/hr-flex/HR..flex.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004)); see also
Jacqueline Simon, AFGE, Dismantling the Civil Service: A Labor Perspective on
Developments Affecting Federal Labor Relations, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON WORK 27, 28
(Industrial Relations Research Association, 2003) (stating that OPM found a vast array of
flexibilities for agency managers).
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existing personnel rules in Title 5 "allowed government agencies to
emulate high-performing workplaces."
260
Still, there were only fleeting references to the experiences of
unionized workers or policy decisions about labor generally. Senator Jon
Corzine (D-N.J.) complained that the Republican bill "undermines... a
,261
national commitment to the right to organize.' 2  Senator Sarbanes asserted
that "[w]e have spent a long part of our history working out these employee
rights, and they are important to the success of the Government. 
,
262
Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) added, "All employees-whether they be
in the public or the private sector-deserve to be protected against the
arbitrary treatment" the Republican bill would allow.263 Senator Bingaman
went on to note that long-established practices in government service had
"worked well through national crises of all kinds" and that there was no
evidence that the system had broken down in the past or that it would break
down in this instance.26
Some proponents of union rights did make a point that is supported by
the broader industrial relations literature: unions often improve morale and
therefore improve employee retention. Representative Albert Wynn (D-
Md.) insisted that if DHS workers "do not feel secure that they receive fair
consideration for their employment concerns," it would cause "a loss of
morale. 265 Senator Sarbanes agreed that "[t]aking these rights away...
will undercut the morale of these employees. We will get lesser
performance. ,,66 But these union proponents did not discuss the
evidence that unions actually do positively impact employee retention in a
variety of contexts.
4. Ignoring Unionized Public Safety Workers
As in old debates over police and fire departments, questions of
efficiency and loyalty were heightened in the DHS debates because these
jobs involve public safety. Even in the past forty years, police and
firefighters have been treated as somewhat special cases, at least in that
267
they are not allowed to strike even where other public workers can.
260. 148 CONG. REc. S8068 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 2002).
261. 148 CONG. REC. S9407 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2002).
262. 148 CONG. REc. S11,194 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2002).
263. 148 CONGREc. S11,373 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002).
264. Id.
265. 148 CONG. REC. H8593 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2002).
266. 148 CONG. REC. S11,194 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2002). Some academics have echoed
this concern. See, e.g., Thessin, supra note 83, at 514 ("[D]epriving DHS employees of
collective bargaining and civil service rights is both unfair and counterproductive. Instead
of improving homeland security, such a move will likely demoralize" federal workers.).
267. KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 236-38 (documenting permissive state strike legislation
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Notably, however, these limitations have not prevented police and
firefighters from being among the most highly unionized professions in the
268country. Further, a majority of states give police and firefighters full
bargaining rights. 69 Yet, as shown above, opponents of worker rights
stress that collective bargaining rights are unwise because of the DHS's
public safety responsibilities.
It is especially disappointing, therefore, that the few references to
other public safety workers in the DHS debates were attempts by
Democrats to argue that the bargaining rights of police and firefighters in
New York City had not interfered with their ability to respond to the 9/11
attacks. It is, of course, relevant that these front-line public workers were
unionized, had bargaining rights, and behaved both efficiently and bravely
(nearly 350 of them lost their lives).2 10  "[T]he heroes of September 11
were union members," insisted Senator Boxer.2 These union members
were "working people.. . who were afforded the protections of collective
bargaining.... They never looked at their watch and said: 'Oh, gee, I have
been on the 74th floor of the World Trade Center, and now I have worked
eight hours and I am coming down.' 27 2 Senator Feinstein echoed that the
"firefighters who ran up the stairs to their deaths did not see any conflict
between worker rights and emergency response. 273 Senator Jack Reed (D-
R.I.) added, "No one checked with their bargaining agent before going up
those stairs. . . They went up those stairs because it was their job and their
duty .... ,,274
But there was insufficient analysis of the effects of bargaining rights
for public safety workers in other contexts. Senator Corzine did mention
that unionization and bargaining is common for such workers. "Union
membership of law enforcement and firefighters across the nation is
unquestioned and standard procedure. Their collective bargaining rights
did not undermine national security. And their work rules did not stop
them from demonstrating a high level of professionalism .... ,275 Senator
Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.) made the only other link to public safety
workers. He quoted a letter from the National Association of Police
in table 8.2).
268. See id. at ch. 3.
269. Twenty-eight states permit police to bargain collectively, and one state allows
individual counties the option to permit such bargaining. Thirty-one states permit
firefighters to bargain collectively, and one state allows individual counties the option to
permit such bargaining. KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 60-61 (documenting state bargaining
legislation from 1999 in table 3.2).
270. See Masters & Albright, supra note 3, at 67.
271. 148 CONG. REc. S8072 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 2002).
272. Id.
273. 148 CONG. REc. S8888 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2002).
274. 148 CONG. REC. S8057 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 2002).
275. 148 CONG. REc. S9407 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2002).
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Organizations (which represents 220,000 police officers across the country)
that supported collective bargaining rights for DHS workers.276  After
noting that "[e]very NYPD and NY/NJ Port Authority officer who died that
day was ... working under a collective bargaining agreement," the letter
stated that "Congress has long recognized the benefits of a mutual working
relationship between labor and management" and that a broad range of
public workers enjoyed bargaining rights.
77
As dramatic (albeit ultimately ineffective) as the examples from 9/11
were, Congress should have looked at the effect of collective bargaining on
public safety workers generally. It can be debated whether police and
firefighters are exactly analogous to, for example, border patrol agents or
customs officers. But surely the comparison would be useful. While DHS
workers certainly have duties that implicate important safety issues, it is
likely that police officers in many cities confront serious safety issues at
least as frequently. And there is no evidence that the collective bargaining
rights that police and firefighters enjoy in a majority of states have
interfered with their ability to protect public safety.
27 s
5. The "Nobody Ever Gets Fired" Idea
A recurring subtheme of the union inefficiency charge is the
managers' alleged inability to fire unionized federal workers. During the
DHS debates, Ari Fleischer gave a hypothetical example in which union
representation could stop a drunken border patrol agent's discharge.279
Senator Miller claimed that a "[f]ederal worker caught drunk on the job
can't be fired for 30 days, and then he has the right to insist on endless
appeals., 280 Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) insisted that it can take "18
months to fire a terrible worker.",28' Senator Byrd replied, "I do not see
anyone defending drunken workers," and labeled Fleischer's comments a
41 282
"needless and irresponsible cheap shot" at federal employees.
Policymakers should consult the actual experiences of unionized employers
to determine whether this was a "cheap shot" or not. In fact, it appears that
it was.
Advocates of bargaining rights did produce data specific to federal
employment that challenged this stereotype. Senator Richard Durbin (D-
276. 148 CONG. REc. S10,621-22 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2002) (quoting a letter from
William J. Johnson to the Senate).
277. Id.
278. See KEARNEY, supra note 16, at 232-34 (discussing the different treatment of
unionized public workers engaged in "essential services").
279. Masters & Albright, supra note 3, at 76.
280. 148 CONG. REc. S8708 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2002).
281. 148 CONG. REc. S9208 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2002).
282. 148 CONG. REc. S7729 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002).
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Ill.) noted that "[i]n fiscal year 2001, 8,920 Federal employees were
terminated and removed for disciplinary reasons., 283  Democrats also
explained that while most federal workers get 30 day notices of hearings,
before being fired,2 4 they can be removed from the job and banished from
the workplace immediately, pending the hearing.285 Senator Akaka added
that under the FSLMRA, managers can remove workers from their posts
and suspend them immediately without pay for national security reasons.286
Also along these lines, AFGE published a report that listed court cases
upholding terminations of federal employees for at least thirty-five types of
behavior, including, but not limited to endangering public health or
safety; 287 insubordination; 28 8 failure to perform duties in an acceptable
manner;289 failure to meet the physical and emotional requirements of the
job ;290 revealing nonpublic information; z91 alcohol-related conduct;
2 92
absence without approved leave; 293 making false statements; 294 excessive
errors;295 sleeping on duty;296 and gambling. 297  AFGE also noted that
283. 148 CONG. REC. S9193 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2002).
284. Unions Fear Bush Will Abuse Freedom from Civil Service Rules, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Nov. 17, 2002, at A14-15; see, e.g., Jones v. Dep't of the Navy, 978 F.2d 1223,
1226 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that the Navy could suspend two employees for an indefinite
period when such a suspension "will promote the efficiency of the service." (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 7513 (1988))). See generally AM. FED'N OFGOv'TEMPLOYEES, supra note 259, at
4 (describing the federal managerial flexibility that has already been established through the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978).
285. Jones, 978 F.2d at 1226.
286. 148 CONG. REC. S8888-89 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2002). Specifically, Senator Akaka
refers to and is supported by the following statutory provision:
[T]he head of an agency may suspend without pay an employee of his agency
when he considers that action necessary in the interests of national security....
[T]he head of an agency may remove an employee suspended under subsection
(a) of this section when, after such investigation and review as he considers
necessary, he determines that removal is necessary or advisable in the interests
of national security.
5 U.S.C. § 7532(a)-(b) (2000).
287. AM. FED'N OF Gov'T EMPLOYEES, supra note 259, at 7 (citing L'Bert v. Dep't of
Veterans Affairs, 88 M.S.P.R. 513 (M.S.P.B. 2001)).
288. Id. at 8 (citing Luciano v. Dep't of the Treasury, 88 M.S.P.R. 335 (M.S.P.B. 2001)).
289. Id. (citing Belcher v. Dep't of the Air Force, 82 M.S.P.R. 230 (M.S.P.B. 1999)).
290. Id. (citing Bullock v. Dep't of the Air Force, 88 M.S.P.R. 531 (M.S.P.B. 2001)).
291. Id. (citing Gibb v. Dep't of the Treasury, 88 M.S.P.R. 135 (M.S.P.B. 2001)).
292. Id. (citing Edwards v. Dep't of the Army, 87 M.S.P.R. 27 (M.S.P.B. 2000)).
293. Id. (citing Wooten v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 87 M.S.P.R. 680 (M.S.P.B. 2001)).
294. Id. at 8 (citing Wooten, 87 M.S.P.R. at 680 (falsifying work records); Jones v. Dep't
of Justice, 87 M.S.P.R. 91 (M.S.P.B. 2000) (falsifying job applications); Wheeler v. Dep't
of the Army, 47 M.S.P.R. 240 (M.S.P.B. 1991) (falsifying medical information); Raymond
v. Dep't of the Army, 34 M.S.P.R. 476 (M.S.P.B. 1987) (falsifying expense accounts);
Watson v. Dep't of the Air Force, 34 M.S.P.R. 656 (M.S.P.B. 1987) (falsifying time cards)).
295. Id. (citing Taylor v. Dep't of the Air Force, 80 M.S.P.R. 450 (M.S.P.B. 1998)).
296. id. (citing Bond v. Dep't of Energy, 82 M.S.P.R. 534 (M.S.P.B. 1999)).
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federal workers can be removed without cause during their probationary
298year. AFGE noted that federal managers have nonnegotiable power to
set performance standards. 299 Thus, an employee may be removed for
receiving a rating of "unacceptable" on a single "critical element" of the
job's requirements.300 Further, a termination for poor performance "is
upheld as long as there is some evidence to support the manager's
conclusion."3 1
Further, this debate ignored the experiences of unions in other
contexts. Senator Craig Thomas (R-Wyo.) cited a private sector example
on the Administration's behalf, claiming that "two America West pilots
showed up to work drunk... on Monday and were fired on Tuesday. If
they had been INS personnel, it would have taken 18 months ... to be held
accountable. 3 2 Senator Thomas did not seem to appreciate that under the
RLA, private sector pilots have the right to bargain collectively.3 3
Fundamentally, both sides failed to include relevant evidence from the vast
world of labor relations. Colleen M. Kelley, President of the National
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), characterized the federalized airport
security screeners inability to have union representation as "an insult to...
a broad range of hard-working public employees," but she did not explain
how the experiences of such other employees were applicable to the current
debate. 30 Thus, the debate ignored a wealth of literature on what unions
actually do.
6. Industrial Relations Literature and Evidence That Unions
Increase Efficiency
Many scholars have analyzed the effects of unions, collective
bargaining, and labor laws in a variety of contexts, including books and
297. Id. at 9 (citing Howard v. U.S. Postal Serv., 26 M.S.P.R. 393 (M.S.P.B. 1985)).
298. Id. at 4 (citing Vilt v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 16 M.S.P.R. 192 (M.S.P.B. 1983)).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Martin v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 795 F.2d 995, 997
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (illustrating that the standard to uphold a performance-based termination is
relatively low); 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(l)-(c)(1)(A) (2000) ("[Tlhe decision of the agency shall
be sustained... only if the agency's decision-in the case of an action based on
unacceptable performance... is supported by substantial evidence ... .
302. 148 CONG. REC. S8069 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 2002).
303. See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2000) ("Employees shall have the right to organize and
bargain collectively .... ).
304. Press Release, The National Treasury Employees Union, NTEU's Kelley Calls TSA
Anti-Union Decision "An Insult" to Public Employees Fighting Terrorism (Jan. 10, 2003),
available at http://www.nteu.org/Presskits/PressRelease/PressRelease.aspx?ID=404 (last
visited Feb. 1, 2004).
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articles in various industrial relations journals.3 °5 While differences of
opinion exist, and data can vary among different types of workplaces,
considerable evidence shows that unionized workplaces often increase
productivity and efficiency. These works should be used to help
understand the effect of bargaining in the federal sector. The future of
federal employment and homeland security is too important to be left to
anecdotes and stereotypes.
a. Examples and Summary of Relevant Studies
Data showing that unions have a positive effect come from sources
that range from international surveys to analyses of specific types of
employers. At the broadest level, in 2002, the World Bank released a
report based on more than 1,000 studies on the effects of unions and
collective bargaining.30 6 This report found that countries with high
unionization rates tend to have higher productivity, less pay inequality, and
307lower unemployment. 3° It found that workers who belong to unions are
generally better trained than their nonunion counterparts and that unions
also help retain workers.0 8 Overall, having a large number of workers
represented by unions tends to have a stabilizing and beneficial effect on a
country's economy. 09 At the other end of the spectrum, there are studies of
specific types of public sector unions in the United States. For example,
evidence shows that unionization of teachers correlates positively with
310higher student scores on standardized tests and higher graduation rates.
Regarding American unions generally, Freeman and Medoff's What
Do Unions Do? is arguably the classic book in the industrial relations
311field. Several of their findings are relevant here. First, by providing
workers with a voice in determining work rules and conditions, and by
creating grievance and arbitration procedures, unions greatly reduce the
probability that workers will quit.312 Thus, unionized workforces are more
305. See, e.g., ADVANCES INDUS. & LAB. REL.; COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.; INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV.; INDUS. REL.; J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUB. SECTOR; J. LAB. RES.;
LAB. STUD. J.; Industrial Relations Research Association publications.
306. World Bank, Unions and Collective Bargaining: Economic Effects in a Global





310. Lala Carr Steelman et al., Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance?
Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARv. EDUC. REV. 437, 448-59
(2000).
311. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984).
312. Id. at96.
2004]
U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 6:2
stable than nonunion workforces with comparable pay.313  Second,
management in unionized companies generally operates more "by the
book.' 314 This can mean less flexibility, but it can also mean acting in a
more professional and less arbitrary or authoritarian way.315  Third,
Freeman and Medoff found that in many sectors unionized establishments
are more productive than nonunion establishments, while in only a few
cases do they result in lower productivity.316 The higher productivity is due
in part to lower turnover rates, improved managerial performance in
response to unions, and cooperative labor-management relations at the
plant level.3 17 Unions also promote the ability of individual workers to
speak freely, allow workers to deal with management efficiently with one
collective voice, gain information for workers, monitor employer behavior,
and equalize bargaining power.31 8
This is the clear majority view. A recent survey of the topical
literature concluded that "[t]here is scant evidence that unions act to reduce
productivity... while there is substantial evidence that unions act to
improve productivity in many industries. ' 319  Barry Hirsch offers a
minority, dissenting view arguing that unions do not, on average, increase
productivity.32° Unionization may lead initially to productivity gains due to
the effects of "shock," when management must initially respond to unions
by organizing more efficiently, thereby reducing slack, or due to the effects
of "collective voice" when unions allow workers to voice their preferences
more effectively. 32  Hirsch then questions whether any long-term
313. Id. at94-110.
314. Cf id. at 111-21 (discussing the effects of unions upon firms' adjustments to
business cycles).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 162-80.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Dale Belman & Richard N. Block, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on
Competitiveness and Employment: A Review of the Literature, in BARGAINING FOR
COMPETITIVENESS: LAW, RESEARCH, AND CASE STUDIES 51 (Richard N. Block ed., 2003);
see also, LAWRENCE MISHEL & MATTHEW WALTERS, ECON. POLICY INST., How UNIONS
HELP ALL WORKERS 15 (2003), available at http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/143
/bp143.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) ("Analyses of the union effect on firms and the
economy have generally found unions to be a positive force, improving the performance of
firms and contributing to economic growth." (citations omitted)). This paper refers to
Hirsch's work, infra note 320, as "a dissenting view" and concludes that there was "nothing
in the extensive economic analysis of unions to suggest that there are economic costs that
offset the positive union impact on the wages, benefits, and labor protections of...
workers." Id.
320. Barry T. Hirsch, Unionization and Economic Performance: Evidence on
Productivity, Profits, Investment, and Growth, in UNIONS AND RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: THE
GLOBAL EVIDENCE OF THEIR IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT 35 (Fazil Mihlar ed., 1997). I thank
Professor Hirsch for sharing this paper with me.
321. Id. at42.
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322productivity gains are associated with unionization. He notes that some
studies have not found positive effects on productivity in certain
government agencies.323 For example, he cites a study which found that
police unions could somewhat diminish productivity regarding minor
crimes (no effect was found for serious crimes).1
24
Notably, part of Hirsch's argument is based on his finding that
"unions significantly increase compensation for their members but do not
increase productivity sufficiently to offset the cost increases from higher
compensation. 325 While the question of whether higher wages are fully
offset by productivity gains is important in the private sector, it is irrelevant
326in the federal sector, because wages are not negotiable. Moreover, in the
context of national security, one could argue that increased productivity
and efficiency is the central goal. It is vital, therefore, to study the
industrial relations literature with an eye for what lessons are transferable
to the federal sector and to the DHS.
The combined teaching of most industrial relations literature on
efficiency is that while unions increase productivity in most circumstances,
they can decrease it in others.327 Making policy for any particular type of
322. Id. at 42-49.
323. Id. at 46-47.
324. Id. at 47 (citing Dennis Byrne et al., Unions and Police Productivity: An
Econometric Investigation, 35 INDUS. REL. 566, 580-81 (1996)).
325. Id. at 35.
326. See infra Section II.B.1.
327. In 1992, Freeman wrote that "[t]he majority of studies find that union firms have
higher productivity, but there are well-documented exceptions." Richard Freeman, Is
Declining Unionization of the U.S. Good, Bad, or Irrelevant?, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC
COMPETITIVENESS 143, 156 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992) (citing studies
on union productivity effects in 1986 and more recently). For other works consulted to
derive this conclusion, see BARRY T. HIRSCH, LABOR UNIONS AND THE ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS (1991) (examining the impact of collective bargaining on the
economic performance of publicly traded U.S. manufacturing companies in the 1970s);
Steven G. Allen, Unionization and Productivity in Office Building and School Construction,
39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 187, 187-201 (1986) (comparing the difference in productivity
between union and nonunion contractors within two samples taken from the 1970s);
Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Productivity-Enhancing Innovations in Work
Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation in the Union Versus the
Nonunion Sectors, in 6 ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS 63-103 (David
Lewin & Donna Sockell eds., 1994) (discussing studies which compare productivity levels
in the union sector to the nonunion sector; finding that unionized firms engage in
productivity enhancing projects to a greater extent than the profit-sharing programs common
in the nonunion sector); Casey Ichniowski, The Effects of Grievance Activity on
Productivity, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 75, 75-90 (1986) (examining the relationship
between grievance filing rates and economic performance; concluding that nonunion mills
have lower productivity); Daniel B. Cornfield, Labor Union Responses to Technological
Change: Past, Present, and Future, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK 35-38 (1997) (discussing the
response of labor unions to technological change). I thank the many industrial relations
scholars on the IRRA listserve who helped me with this issue.
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employer requires a more fine-grained analysis. For example, a recent
study found that unionized employers that promote joint decision-making
coupled with incentive-based compensation have higher productivity than
other similar nonunion plants, while unionized employers that maintain
more traditional labor management relations may have lower
328productivity. Another study found that unionized firms in the mining
and office construction fields were significantly more productive than
nonunion firms in the same fields. 32 9  But this increased productivity
disappeared where the labor relations climate worsened (measured by
higher rates of grievances, wildcat strikes, and other conflicts).330 These
findings suggest that those at the DHS and other federal agencies interested
in maximizing efficiency should devote their efforts to promoting joint
decisionmaking and encouraging a positive labor relations climate, rather
than eliminating worker rights.
This article cannot conclusively show which industrial relations
studies are the most persuasive regarding the precise contours of a new
federal personnel system. But, it can point to studies showing that in many
settings, unions increase efficiency, and it can also note the lack of hard
evidence that unions necessarily hurt efficiency, especially if other
effective labor relations tools are in place.
Of course, some differences between DHS workers and other types of
unionized workers exist. But these differences can be overstated, and
debates on the relative efficiency of employers using collective bargaining
cannot take place in a vacuum. While the DHS is responsible for public
safety, the public sector has considerable experience in forging bargaining
rules for public safety workers. 33' Also, there are private sector workers
covered by the NLRA or RLA-in the transportation, food, medical and
energy industries, among others-whose duties are intimately connected to
the public's safety, security, and health.
b. Input from Workers
Perhaps the most relevant point that policymakers can take from the
industrial relations literature concerning these debates is that bargaining
328. See Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace
Practices and Information Technology on Productivity, in 83 REVIEW OF ECON. &
STATISTICS 434, 434-45 (2001) (finding that higher productivity is related more closely to
how an employer implements a chosen work practice within the business rather than
employer's choice of any particular work practice).
329. Dale Belman, Unions, the Quality of Labor Relations, and Firm Performance, in
UNIONS AND EcONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 50-51, 66-70 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos
eds., 1992).
330. Id.
331. See infra Section IV.C.4.
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can increase efficiency because it facilitates effective input from workers.
This input helps solve problems and prevents abusive or inefficient
behavior by management. Along these lines, AFGE's Harnage claims that
if the TSA had involved unions more, the agency might have avoided a
number of problems that it has experienced.332
The TSA's employment problems were numerous, serious, and
widespread.333 By March 2003, TSA workers around the country were
complaining of low morale.334 They cited inadequate training (which they
said had increased injury rates) and inadequate safety equipment (for
example, no radiation detection badges for X-ray machine operators).335
They claimed that TSA managers showed favoritism toward screeners who
formerly worked for private companies, and that the TSA had not
disciplined supervisors guilty of sexual harassment.
3 36
Scheduling problems were common: one screener said that he worked
twenty-five straight days; another said screeners often work six or seven
hour stretches without any bathroom or food breaks.337 Many complained
of simply not knowing their schedules.338 Some screeners claimed they
were not paid for over a month.339 TSA official David Stone admitted that
on one payday alone in November 2002, 130 screeners at the Los Angeles
International Airport did not receive paychecks. 340 These types of problems
were reported in cities including Orlando, New York, Boston, and Los
Angeles.341
The TSA's failure to deal with these issues created retention problems,
as the industrial relations literature would predict.342 In February 2003, the
screener turnover rate was between 30% and 35% at airports where TSA
had assumed staffing responsibilities.343 In Charlotte alone, thirty screeners
resigned.344 Furthermore, problems may become worse, as the TSA, facing
332. Donald G. Aplin, AFGE Challenges Ridge to Restore Screener Rights in DHS
Workforce Reform, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2014, at 630 (June 17, 2003).
333. Donald G. Aplin, AFGE Charters National Air Screener Local, Challenges Legality
of TSA Bargaining Ban, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2000, at 253 (Mar. 11, 2003).






340. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Federal Airport Workers Tell of Pay Glitches, Employee
Miscues, and Problems, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at A17.
341. See Ramstack, supra note 257, at A01; Barker, supra note 95, at HI.
342. See infra Section IV.C.6.
343. Letter from Bobby L. Hamage, Sr., National President, AFGE, to the Honorable
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) (Feb. 21, 2003), http://www.afge.org//Index.cfm
?Page=AirportScreeners&File=2003_02_21 _letter.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
344. See Ted Reed, Union Targeting Screeners, but Security Workers May Be Ineligible,
CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Nov. 20, 2002, at ID.
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a $500 million dollar deficit and a major budget cut, is cutting back on
screeners. 45 In March 2003, TSA had 55,600 screeners, but it announced it
would cut 6,000 workers in 240 airports by September 30.
346
Many of these problems arguably involve the type of issues that
giving workers a voice could have helped resolve. For example, federal
sector unions can bargain over training and safety issues. While scheduling
is a management right,347 unions can help gain information about schedules
for their members, and can bring problems about scheduling to
management's attention. Unions can also help by clarifying and explaining
the rules. For example, a screener at Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky
International Airport said that supervisors gave inconsistent orders as to
how workers should respond when detection wands revealed metallic
objects.348  Even TSA's Melendez said that the screener workforce is
"probably our most important asset" and that "it's in TSA's best interest to
work with screeners. '349  Significant evidence indicates that bargaining
creates an effective mechanism for employees to work with employers,
giving employees a voice that improves quality and morale.3 °
Again, however, the debates did not discuss the pros and cons of
bargaining as a mechanism for worker input. Tellingly, in all the debates
on the DHS in the Congressional Record, there is only one voice of an
actual federal worker. Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.) quoted Mark Hall, a
border patrol agent, who argued that union rights improve agency
functioning.351' Hall wrote that after he criticized what he felt was under-
staffing, management retaliated against him with a suspension, demotion,
and reassignment.352 An investigation revealed that Hall's sector chief had
said that border patrol managers should have "no tolerance for dissent" and
should "view resistance from the rank and file as insubordinate., 353 Hall
credited union rights both for giving him the courage to speak out and for
enabling him to reverse the disciplinary actions. He concluded that "[o]ur
union has helped me and my fellow officers make this nation a better and
345. See Donald G. Aplin, TSA to Cut 6,000 Federal Airport Screeners; Budget
Constraints, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2008, at 274 (May 6, 2003) (quoting the
TSA's budget for fiscal year 2003 at $5.98 billion, while its proposed budget for fiscal year
2004 is $4.82 billion).
346. Stephen Barr, Budget Shortfall Could Prompt Cutbacks in Airport Screeners,
WASH. POST, May 14, 2003, at B2; see also Barker, supra note 95, at HI.
347. See BROIDA, supra note 38, at ch. 6.
348. See Ramstack, supra note 257, at AOl.
349. Donald G. Aplin, AFGE Challenges Ridge to Restore Screener Rights in DHS
Workforce Reform, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2014, at 630 (June 17, 2003).
350. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 327, at 187-201.
351. 148 CONG. REc. S10624 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2002).
352. Id.
353. Id.
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safer place. 354
D. Unions That Cannot Bargain Still Exist: Into the Discredited Past?
Significantly, bans on collective bargaining in federal employment
today would not make unions disappear. Under case law that emerged in
the 1960s, union organizing, is generally constitutionally protected.355
Indeed, unions at the TSA and elsewhere have promised to continue to
356represent their members even if they cannot bargain. Notably, before the
1960s there was a long history of public sector unions, including those in
the federal sector, which existed without the right to bargain.357 Because
this history may soon be replicated on a wide scale, policymakers should
study it more closely to decide if this rejected past is truly a desirable
destination.
Public sector unions were active long before they began winning the
formal rights to organize and bargain in the 1960s.358 Union density in
government was 10% to 13% from the late 1930s to the late 1950s; this
was significant, given that by 1934, government bodies employed 3.3
million people.359 In this era, federal workers were marginally better off
than other public workers, as the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912 gave federal
employees the right to form unions, albeit not to bargain. 360 Thus today,
significant parts of the federal workforce may be reverting to what federal
workers had by law during the fifty years between the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
and Kennedy's Executive Order, and what many state and local
government workers had in fact during this era: the ability to join unions
without the right to bargain.
1. What Did Unions Do Without Bargaining Rights?
In this "pre-collective bargaining" era, public sector unions engaged in
354. Id. (quoting statement from July 31, 2002); see also 148 CONG. REC. S8068 (daily
ed. Sept. 3, 2002) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (discussing the incidents described by Hall).
355. See, e.g., Keyeshian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967) (holding that
public employment cannot be predicated on relinquishing right of association); Atkins v.
City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068, 1077 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (finding that a ban on
firefighters unionizing violates the First Amendment).
356. See infra Section IV.D.2.
357. See infra Section IV.D. 1. See generally SLATER, supra note 14
358. See SLATER, supra note 14, at ch. 3.
359. Id. at 82.
360. The Lloyd-LaFollette Act provided that federal employees could be discharged only
for cause and that union membership was not cause if the union imposed no duty to strike.
Lloyd La Follette Act, Pub. L. No. 336, 37 Stat. 555 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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three major types of activities to try to represent their members.36' First,
they used politics-from elections to lobbying to trying to enlist public
pressure-in order to influence public officials who were employers.362
Second, they represented workers under other legal frameworks such as in
civil service hearings. 363 Third, they engaged in "informal" bargaining,
which in some cases led to quasi-collective agreements or at least
understandings.36
Unions of federal workers used these tactics prior to the 1960s.
Without the formal right to bargain, the AFL's AFGE, the CIO's United
Federal Workers of America (UFWA), and the National Federation of
Federal Employees campaigned for laws that would raise pay, improve
civil service exams, require cause for discharge, and standardize rules.365
366These unions also used informal bargaining. The UFWA explained that
various types of "agreements" and "signed statements.., serve the place of
,,367
the contract that is used by an industrial union. The unions took part in
labor-management committees when they were available.3 6' They
represented members in civil service hearings, and they distributed
information to members regarding the often arcane rules of federal
369employment. Union efforts in these decades were often creative and
sometimes effective, but because they lacked institutional rights, they often
failed. Yet they continued to organize and press management in ways that
most parties involved ultimately decided were less efficient than giving the
workers some collective bargaining rights. 7
Studies of the federal workplace in this era indicate that the older
personnel systems were not effective. A recurring theme in public sector
history becomes evident. The direct employer of labor, when allowed to
make the "law," gives workers too few rights. The desire of federal
managers for power and discretion conflicts with the inevitable and
beneficial reality of workers seeking a greater voice. Officials did institute
some grievance procedures and employee participation programs. 37' But
managers adjudicated all grievances, with the unsurprising result that
management won almost all the cases.372 Some supervisors even argued
361. See SLATER, supra note 14, at 91, 95.
362. Id. at 105-17.
363. Id. at 117-18.
364. Id. at 123.
365. RUNG, supra note 58, at 105-36.
366. Id. at 125-36.
367. SLATER, supra note 14, at 127.
368. RUNG, supra note 58, at 127-28.
369. SLATER, supra note 14, at 117-18.
370. Id. at 135-36.
371. Id. at 113-25.
372. Id.
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against standardized procedures in principle, on the grounds that they
would give employees a sense that they had "rights. 373 Margaret Rung
concludes that while some federal managers tried to include unions, they
gave workers too little actual voice.374 In 1955 a government commission
found that "the Federal government has lagged behind other organizations
in recognizing the value of providing formal means for employee-
management consultation.
2. What Unions Are Doing Now at the TSA: History Repeating?
a. Organizing and Fighting to Win Bargaining Rights
Today, if denied bargaining rights, federal sector unions are likely to
repeat behaviors from the first half of the twentieth century when they
could not bargain. The example of the TSA, where bargaining has already
been prohibited, is illustrative.
AFGE has continued to organize TSA workers despite Loy's Order,
although not without resistance.376 AFGE originally tried to form separate
locals at separate airports. 37 7 By mid-February 2003, it had filed petitions
for local unions at LaGuardia, Baltimore-Washington International,
378Orlando, Chicago-Midway, JFK, and ten other airports. Then the TSA
took the position that screeners should not be allowed to form locals in
individual airports but instead should be required to hold an election for a
union that would cover all airports.379 This type of "multi-unit" organizing
is traditionally more difficult for unions.3 °  Nonetheless, on March 3
AFGE chartered a nationwide local, 81 and by early May approximately 100
screeners had become dues-paying members of this local.382
AFGE's initial strategy includes a fight to win bargaining rights. The
373. See id. at 114-15.
374. RUNG, supra note 58, at 135.
375. NESBITT, supra note 203, at 15 (quoting U.S. COMM'N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OFGOv'T, Report of the Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service 110 (1955)).
376. Donald G. Aplin, AFGE Challenges Ridge to Restore Screener Rights in DHS
Workforce Reform, 41 Gov't Empl. Re]. Rep. (BNA) No. 2014, at 629 (June 17, 2003).
377. Id.
378. Bacon, supra note 115, at 5.
379. Id.
380. Id. Perhaps not coincidentally, Clifford Hardt, a TSA manager, was the director for
special projects for Federal Express. Federal Express had in the past used the strategy of
insisting on a national bargaining unit. Id.
381. Donald G. Aplin, AFGE Charters National Air Screener Local, Challenges Legality
of TSA Bargaining Ban, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2000, at 253 (Mar. 11, 2003).
382. Donald G. Aplin, TSA to Cut 6,000 Federal Airport Screeners; Budget Constraints,
Efficiency, Drive Change, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2008, at 475 (May 6, 2003).
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Orlando Sentinel described this battle as "Becoming 'A Holy War.
''3 83
The newspaper reported that AFGE was "continuing its organizing blitz,
targeting airport after airport in hopes that its legal challenges will
prevail-or that political pressures might change the administration's
thinking."384 On the political front, on June 11, 2003 Hamage wrote to
Loy, asking him to reverse his order and arguing that the TSA had not
given persuasive reasons why bargaining would compromise security.385
TSA official Brian Turmail replied that, in responding to threats about
another "shoe bomber" around January 1, 2003, the TSA was able to "have
more screeners on duty" and "order screeners to check shoes" without
386having to check work rules.
AFGE has also tried litigation. In January 2003, the union filed a
lawsuit claiming that Loy lacked the statutory authority to ban collective
bargaining and that such an order violated constitutional guarantees of free
speech, free association, and equal protection. 38' AFGE argued that the law
establishing the TSA mandated that the personnel system of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) would apply to the TSA, and that the FAA
388system requires collective bargaining. AFGE also argued that the DHS
statute does not allow the head of the TSA to prohibit bargaining.389 On
September 5, 2003, the district court for the District of Columbia dismissed
this suit, finding that the court did not have jurisdiction over the claims and
that the union's recourse was with the FLRA. 390 Also, the court found that
Loy's order did not violate the First Amendment, because the order
prohibited bargaining, not organizing. 39' The union has promised to appeal.
"We're not going to abandon these employees," said John Gage, the new
383. Barker, supra note 95, at HI.
384. Id.
385. Donald G. Aplin, AFGE Challenges Ridge to Restore Screener Rights in DHS
Workforce Reform, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2014, at 629 (June 17, 2003).
386. Id. at 629-30.
387. Donald G. Aplin, AFGE Charters National Air Screener Local, Challenges Legality
of TSA Bargaining Ban, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2000, at 253 (Mar. 11, 2003);
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, AFGE v. Loy, No. 1-03-0043 (D.D.C. Jan.
10, 2003).
388. Donald G. Aplin, AFGE Charters National Air Screener Local, Challenges Legality
of TSA Bargaining Ban, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2000, at 253 (Mar. 11, 2003);
Complaint, supra note 387, at 3 (citing Federal Aviation Administration's personnel
management system, 49 U.S.C. § 40122(a)-(g)(2) (2000); Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)).
389. Donald G. Aplin, AFGE Charters National Air Screener Local, Challenges Legality
of TSA Bargaining Ban, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2000, at 253 (Mar. 11, 2003);
Christopher Lee & Sara Kehaulani Goo, TSA Blocks Attempt to Unionize Screeners, WASH.
POST, Jan. 10, 2003, at A19.
390. AFGE v. Loy, 173 L.R.R.M. 2358 (D.D.C. 2003).
391. AFGE Must Pursue TSA Bargaining Rights Challenge Before FLRA, District Court
Says, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2025, at 914 (Sept. 16, 2003).
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president of AFGE.39 2
In July 2003, a Regional Director of the FLRA rejected a similar
challenge by AFGE made in the form of a representation petition.393 In its
brief, AFGE repeated the argument that Loy lacked the power to ban
bargaining, and added alternatively that even if Loy had such authority, the
FLRA should recognize the union for other representational purposes.
39 4
Asked whether the FLRA had ever recognized AFGE where the union
could not bargain, AFGE President Bobby Hamage replied, "It's a first for
",395us. Before this administration, we didn't have this problem ....
Hamage insisted that FLRA's rejection of AFGE's petition "has absolutely
no impact on AFGE's organizing campaign. The campaign can't be
stopped and it won't be stopped. 396 In November, 2003, a divided FLRA
upheld the Regional Director's decision, ruling that since the head of the
TSA had banned collective bargaining, the FLRA was without jurisdiction
to grant union representation petitions for TSA employees.397
b. What Will Federal Sector Unions Do, If Not Bargain?
In the event that Loy's Order remains unchanged, AFGE officials
have laid out an agenda for the union that is directly out of the first half of
the twentieth century. AFGE says it will represent TSA employees in
grievance hearings or whatever forum is provided to deal with labor issues,
and will represent members in lawsuits under various modem era
employment laws ranging from workers compensation to anti-
discrimination laws.398
392. Press Release, American Federation of Government Employees, Court Tells AFGE
to Go Back to FLRA; Union Files Appeal With FLRA (Sept. 5, 2003), at
http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressReleaselD=279 (last visited Feb.
1, 2004).
393. Donald G. Aplin, TSA Screeners Have No Bargaining Rights; Authority Rejects
Representation Petitions, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2017, at 723 (July 15,
2003).
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of TSA Bargaining Ban, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2000, at 253 (Mar. 11, 2003).
395. Id. at 254.
396. Donald G. Aplin, TSA Screeners Have No Bargaining Rights; Authority Rejects
Representation Petitions, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2017, at 723 (July 15,
2003).
397. DHS and AFGE, FLRA (No. WA-RP-03-0023, Nov. 4, 2002); Authority Affirms
Rejection of TSA Representation Petitions, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2036, at
1202 (Dec. 12, 2003).
398. See Donald G. Aplin, AFGE Charters National Air Screener Local, Challenges
Legality of TSA Bargaining Ban, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2000, at 253 (Mar.
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How well will this work? So far, the two sides have butted heads in a
not particularly productive manner. On June 11, AFGE filed a federal
court suit alleging that TSA managers disciplined a Pittsburgh screener for
engaging in protected union activity while off-duty, in violation of the First
Amendment.399 TSA spokesperson Nico Melendez responded that workers
had the right to join a union, but added, not reassuringly, "there's nothing
we can do about that.' 4°0 On August 13, AFGE filed a separate class action
suit against the TSA, alleging that its reduction-in-force procedures violate
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Veterans' Preference Act,
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the First and Fifth
Amendments of the Constitution. 401 "TSA management is using its staff
reduction to remove employees they don't like, despite their performance
record," said Harnage.40 2 "It's not what you know, but who you know.
' 4°3
Indeed, it appears that currently evolving labor-management relations in
the TSA are counterproductive and inefficient. A review of the history of
federal sector labor relations could well show that bargaining rights are the
solution, not the problem.
V. CIVIL SERVICE
Many of the lessons from public sector labor relations are applicable
to civil service rules. Civil service laws have existed at the state and
federal levels for even longer than public sector bargaining laws; they were
created for good reasons and supported by a broad consensus of political
opinion. There is no evidence that the existence of these rules has created
any security problems. In late 2003, it was estimated that almost one
million federal employees would be taken out of the federal civil service
system once the DHS and DOD established their alternate personal
systems.4 4 Again, the parties should study jurisdictions that have had these
399. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, AFGE TSA Local 1 v.
Loy, No. 030976 (W.D. Pa. Jun. 11, 2003).
400. Donald G. Aplin, AFGE Challenges Ridge to Restore Screener Rights in DHS
Workforce Reform, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2014, at 630 (June 17, 2003). On
the other hand, Loy met with AFGE officials and agreed to allow deductions of payroll dues
for workers who joined a union. Donald G. Aplin, TSA to Cut 6,000 Federal Airport
Screeners; Budget Constraints, Efficiency Drive Change, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
No. 2008, at 475 (May 6, 2003).
401. Class Action Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, AFGE v.
Loy, No. 1-03-01719, 173 L.R.R.M. 2358 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2003), available at
http://www.afge.org/DocumentslrSA-LeimervLoy.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
402. Press Release, AFGE Fights Illegal Layoffs at TSA (Aug. 13 2003), available at
http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressReleaselD=269 (last visited Feb.
1,2004).
403. Id.
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laws and those that have not before jettisoning procedures and protections
that were developed over more than a century ago.
Obviously, the history of federal practices is relevant. Margaret
Rung's detailed study of the federal civil service system in the first half of
the 20th century describes tensions between merit ideals and the desire of
agency heads to make political appointments.4 °5 She also notes that civil
service protections were often not sufficient to prevent various forms of
406discrimination. But also, the experiences of state governments should
not be ignored. These experiences underscore the importance of civil
service protections not only for workers but for effective public service.
A. Why State Civil Service Rules Developed and Why They Were
Strengthened
State governments adopted civil service systems for the same reasons
as the federal government: to replace the spoils system with the merit
system. Illinois actually adopted its law under circumstances remarkably
similar to those that led to the federal Pendleton Act; the state passed the
"Optional Civil Service Act for Cities" in 1895 after Mayor Carter Harrison
of Chicago was killed by a disappointed office-seeker.4 7 Illinois then
passed a civil service law for state employees in 1905.408 Other states that
passed similar laws early on included New York, which passed the first
such law in 1883, Massachusetts in 1884, Wisconsin in 1905, New Jersey
in 1908, California and Ohio in 1913, Kansas in 1915, and Maryland in
1920.4 09 By 1944, nineteen states had adopted civil service systems, as had
410 411hundreds of cities. In 1948, eleven more states adopted such systems .
Thus, even in the first half of the century, governments at all levels
increasingly rejected political cronyism and embraced merit as a way to
improve government services. Political machines came under increasing
pressure. For example, Franklin Roosevelt's forces successfully pressed
412civil service rules on unsympathetic state and local Democratic bosses.Reformers wanted a more efficient government, one with a personnel
Says, 41 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 2037, at 1210 (Dec. 9, 2003).
405. RUNG, supra note 58, at 73-74.
406. Id.
407. JOSEPH POIS ET AL., THE MERIT SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS 5, 25-27 (1935).
408. Id. at 27.
409. Id. at 5.
410. Joseph Slater, Down by Law: Public Sector Unions and the State in America, World
War I to World War II 123-24 (1998) (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University),
microformed on UMI No. 9924382 (Univ. Microforms Int'l) (citing several studies of civil
service systems).
411. MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE STATE: THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL
EXPERIENCE 81(1994).
412. Id. at 82-83.
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413
system that could hire and retain competent and effective workers.
The inadequacies of some early state and local civil service systems
are also instructive for modem debates. Some laws excluded large
numbers of public workers. Even by the late 1950s, only 51-65% of all
414government employees were covered by civil service rules. Also, those
covered often received surprisingly few rights. In the 1930s, the Illinois
law only allowed appeal of a discharge motivated by racial, religious, or
political reasons, and the Wisconsin law only covered religious or political
motivations.4 5 Without general "just cause" protection, it was relatively
416easy to trump up charges. A 1935 study of the civil service in Chicago
and Cook County, Illinois, found that "Spoils Politics ha[d] ham-strung the
merit system.' '417 One key flaw was that elected officials exercised political
418control over civil service coverage.
Here again, a key impediment to the adequate protection of worker
rights in the public sector was the ability of public officials to make
effective "law" for their own employees. In the civil service context, cities
often set their own civil service standards. 41 9 As with labor relations rules,
this allowed the bosses of local political machines to write or administer
rules so that they retained significant power. Therefore, as one study
concluded, many states "accepted the merit principle in name only, 42° and
patronage remained a real problem during much of the twentieth century.
While the big city machines in Chicago (Daley) and New York
(Tammany Hall) were the most infamous, inadequate civil service
protections created patronage problems in towns of all sizes. Examples can
be seen through the eyes of members of the Building Service Employees
International Union (BSEIU) in the 1930s. The BSEIU represented janitors
and other service workers in public employment, and it often confronted
patronage.421  BSEIU officer Elizabeth Grady complained, "Politics
prevails in all these public jobs. ' ' 22 Workers across the country supported
this claim. In St. Louis in 1938, BSEIU members wrote that in the city
sanitarium, "[a]ttendants [were] given their jobs through the various
413. Id. at 84.
414. SLATER, supra note 14, at 125 (citing LEO KRAMER, LABOR'S PARADOX: THE
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO 29-30
(1962)).
415. Id. at 125-26 (citing sources discussing the merit system).
416. See KRAMER, supra note 414, at 11, 27.
417. Id.
418. SLATER, supra note 14, at 117.
419. SOLOMON FABRICANT, THE TREND OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED
STATES SINCE 1900 91 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, No. 56, 1952).
420. Slater, Down by Law, supra note 410, at 126 (citing DANIEL R. GRANT & H.C.
NIXON, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 349 (1967)).
421. SLATER, supra note 14, at 97-124.
422. Id. at 115.
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Aldermen and Committeemen" who demanded obedience to "ward
organizations. '423 Around the same time in San Antonio, all the employees
in the county courthouse were fired after a new sheriff took over and
424decided to hire his friends. BSEIU officer Paul David summed up the
problem: "If one party is in power they want their friends taken care of in
the city jobs, and if the other party gets in power, they want their friends
taken care of.
4 25
Thus, public workers fought for civil service coverage throughout the
twentieth century. When they achieved coverage, it was a real victory for
employee rights and better government service. After winning civil service
protection, one janitor remarked that "we are no longer compelled to pay
tribute to some politician to hold our jobs. 426
B. Modern Debates: A Return to Patronage?
In the DHS debates, there were only a handful of references to the
history and purpose of civil service rules. Representative Albert Wynn (D-
Md.) noted that the DHS law gives "managers unilateral authority to write
their own rules" and thus "allows an immense bureaucratic fiefdom to be
created in which managers can bestow favors on their cronies .... ,427
Representative Louise Slaughter (D-N.Y.) added that civil service "protects
Americans against the spoils system" and that the DHS should "be staffed
by professionals, not the political cronies of whichever party happens to
hold the White House. ' 28  Jacqueline Simon of AFGE said that civil
service rules ensured that "winning a federal job is a matter of what you
know, not whom you know" and that career development would be based
on merit, not "political affiliation or union status. 429
Meanwhile, advocates of the DHS bill propounded theories that
ignored the history of problems that civil service protections were created
to combat. The Heritage Foundation's report explicitly called for increased
politicization and fewer civil service rights in the federal service. The
report rejected the merit principle even in theory. The "whole
423. Id. at 115-16.
424. Id. at 116.
425. Id.
426. Id.; see also id. at 116-17 (noting that the BSEIU and other public sector unions
lobbied for civil service laws); KRAMER, supra note 414, at 27 (attributing civil service
reforms to AFSCME lobbying efforts in the 1930s).
427. 148 CONG. REc. H8593 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2002).
428. Id. at H8591.
429. Compensation Reform: How Should the Federal Government Pay Its Employees?:
Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Civil Serv. and Agency Org. Comm. on Gov't
Reform, 108th Cong. 134 (2003) (statement of Jacqueline Simon, Public Policy Director,
AFGE), available at http://a257.g.aKamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14sep20031230
/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/1 08hrg/8924 1.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
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governmental apparatus must be managed" on the principle of "loyalty first
and expertise second.' 430 Indeed, "[p]icking appointees who are 'best for
the job' merely in terms of expert qualifications can be disastrous...
because the best qualified are ... part of the status quo ... .,,431 Most
relevant here, the report stated, "Political appointees should make key
,,032management decisions ....
In addition, the report was highly skeptical of the right of workers to
oppose unbridled management discretion. It criticized the fact that the
"civil servant ... has been empowered to police his environment, blow the
whistle on his employer ... and even initiate retaliatory complaints against
a hated manager or supervisor.
433
This report made no mention of historical problems with patronage.
But conservatives as well as liberals should be worried about a return to
patronage if civil service protections are weakened. Most obviously,
conservatives could be disfavored in a liberal administration. More
generally, conservatives should agree that in government employment,
where there is often less of a direct, "bottom line" accountability than in
private markets, the prospect of managers firing workers for reasons
unrelated to merit is especially worrisome.434
Both sides should investigate history. Senator Lieberman argued that
"the civil service evolved for a reason. It was designed to ... protect the
Federal workforce from favoritism, from patronage, from
politicization .... ,3 Senator Feingold agreed that civil service was
created "to end the corrupt patronage system that had permeated
government hiring and advancement. ' 436 Senator Daschle worried that the
DHS bill "would return us to an era when patronage and political cronyism
ran the Federal workforce. ' ,43 7 History shows that civil service did help
prevent such problems, in state government as well as federal.
Once more, a key historical lesson is that giving public officials too
430. Nesterczuk, supra note 62, at 9.
431. Id. at 9-10.
432. Id. at 3.
433. Id. at 18.
434. Discriminating against public employees who are not in policy-making positions
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Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990). But this Constitutional protection would not be
adequate to stop those who would make ideology a driving factor in federal employment
decisions. First, this protection is significantly more narrow than general protection on the
basis of merit that civil service rules provide. Second, civil service systems also provide
administrative procedures to adjudicate the substantive rights provided, because employees
are more likely to try to enforce their rights in an administrative forum rather than in more
lengthy and costly court litigation.
435. 148 CONG. REc. S8070 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 2002).
436. 148 CONG. REc. S9687 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2002).
437. 148 CONG. REc. S10,621 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2002).
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much power to set employment rules for their own employees is fraught
with peril. As Senator Bingaman noted, "There are no protections against
management that use the 'flexibility' available in this bill to settle a
personal or professional grudge."4" The law risked creating "a system
based on individual whims and not established law." 4 39 Today, rank-and-
file workers are afraid. In May 2003, screeners at Pittsburgh International
Airport, which was slated to lose 40% of its screeners, expressed fears that
"cronyism" would determine who was let go and who would be retained.440
VI. CONCLUSION: LEARNING FROM THE LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY
The future is unsettled. The DHS has yet to make final its personnel
system, litigation regarding the TSA is pending, and debates continue
regarding the DOD. Again, the issue of how to design these personnel
policies is important not just for the workers and agencies involved, but
also for labor relations generally. The debates should be informed by the
history and experience of various types of unions, employers, and
bargaining regimes, as well as civil service systems.
One could conclude that these disputes center more on partisan
politics than the desire to create a better personnel system. "Let's face it,"
Senator Byrd said during the DHS debates, "the players in this
administration do not have much of a reputation as champions of basic
protections for workers." 44' Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) said of the
TSA's ban on bargaining, "It's not homeland security, it's union
busting. ' '442 Senator Daschle added that the DHS bill sought to "exploit the
issue of homeland security in order to advance a preexisting ideological
agenda.., that is anti-worker and obviously anti-union." 443 On the other
side, Senator Gramm claimed that "the reason this has become such a
contentious issue" was that it involved "one of the most powerful political
forces in America-the public employee labor unions.
'"4
But there are signs of opportunities for a more informed debate in the
future. Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) has said that he may introduce
438. 148 CONG. REc. S 11,373 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002).
439. Id. (statement of Sen. Bingaman).
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(Jan. 10, 2003), available at http://www.afge.org//index.ofm?page=airport
Screeners&File=2003_01 10a.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
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amendments revisiting the statutory language on collective bargaining in
the DHS during the 108th Congress.445 Senator George Voinovich (R-
Ohio) stated, "If we do not resolve some of the differences between the
administration and the unions, the chances of this new agency being
successful are remote." 446 He encouraged President Bush to meet with
union officials."7  "As a mayor and governor, I went through
reorganizations, and I learned that you cannot get it done unless you have
built trust with your labor union members.""4 Notably, Voinovich is from
a state where public workers have broad bargaining rights.449 On the union
side, NTEU national counsel Michael McAuley has recently stated that
federal sector labor laws could stand "at least substantial scrutiny," and the
union's message was that "it's a huge missed opportunity not to include
federal employees in this change. 45 °
The new personnel rules in these agencies may be quite different from
the old rules. Or perhaps further considerations will result in something
similar to the original system. Speaking with regard to the DHS, Peter
Levine, general counsel of the Senate Armed Services Committee, recalled
that when the FAA was largely exempted from civil service rules, it made
considerable efforts to create a new personnel system, but in the end, it
"looked a lot like the system it replaced. ' 51 The point, however, is that in
making further considerations, policymakers should be informed by a
history that is not compartmentalized. They should use data from the states
in their role as laboratories of democracy, as well as from all relevant
private and public sector employment in America. They should see how
their concerns have been addressed in the real world instead of relying on
disproved caricatures and outmoded arguments. Only this can ensure
optimal results for the workers, the agencies, and the public.
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